Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

Robert Keal v. Edwin Ray Okelberry : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Karra J. Porter; Christensen and Jensen; attorney for appellee.
Denton M. Hatch; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Keal v. Okelberry, No. 20080301 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/825

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

DENTON M. HATCH, #1413
128 West 900 North, Suite C
Spanish Fork, [JT 84660
Phone (801) 794-3852
Fax (801) 794-3859

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT KEAL,
Plai nti IT an d Appellant,
vs

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
CalseNo 200SOJ01

EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY,
Defendant and Appellee.

This is an appeal from a verdict from the Fourth^ Judicial Conn,
Provo, Utah Count/, Utah, daed Decen tber 3. 2007.

Karra J. Potter
Chmierscn & Jensen, P.C.
15 \Vest South Temple, Suite 800
SaM Lake City, UT 84101
Phone: (801) 323-5000

DentoiiJV!. llalch
128 West 900 North, Suite »I
Spanisri Fork, d a n 84660
Phone:(801)794-3852
Fax: (s!oi) 794-3859

Attorney for Edwin Ray Okelberry
Dcfe ndant/Appellee

Attorney for Robert Kearl
Plaintiff/A ppel lant

Table of Contents
Table of Contents

-

1

Table of Authorities

4

4

Jurisdictional Statement

6

Statement of Issues and Standard Review

6

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

8

Statement of the Case

12

A.

Course Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court

12

B.

Statement of the Facts

12

Summary of Argument

14

Argument

17

I.

The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to ask specific voir
dire questions and give specific jury instructions and when it ruled that
Robert Kearl was not entitled to a new trial based on juror misstatements
and omissions in response to voir dire questions.

II.

A.

Relevant Law

B.

Facts of the Case

20

C.

Duty to Marshal the Evidence

23

D.

Analysis

t

1

17

23

The Trial Court erred in determining that sanctions should not be entered
against Defense Counsel based on Counsel's misconduct and by determining

1

that Plaintiffs Counsel could not argue to the jury what misconduct caused
the evidence to be withdrawn.
A.

Relevant Law

25

B.

Facts of the Case

26

C.

Duty to Marshal the Evidence

31

D.

Analysis

32

The Trial Court erred by allowing Dr. Craig Smith to testify without
allowing Plaintiff to tell the jury that Colorado Casualty Insurance
hired Dr. Smith.
A.

Relevant Law
1.

36

... Concerning the Admissibility of Dr. Smith's
Testimony

2.

36

... Concerning the Admissibility of Evidence Showing that
Dr. Smith was Hired by Colorado Casualty Insurance

37

B.

Facts of the Case

38

C.

Duty to Marshal the Evidence

42

1.

Dr. Smith's testimony should be allowed

42

2.

Plaintiff must not be allowed to reveal evidence concerning
Dr. Smith's employers

D.

Analysis
1.

43
44

Defendant failed to show the admissibility of Dr. Smith's
testimony

44
2

2.

The Court erred in not allowing evidence showing
potential control and bias

IV.

46

The Court erred by failing to enter its disqualification after holding an
Ex parte meeting with Defense Counsel.
A.

Relevant Law

47

B.

Facts of the Case

49

C.

Duty to Marshal the Evidence

50

D.

Analysis

L

51

Conclusion

54

Request for Oral Argument

54

3

Table of Authorities

Clayton v. St. Louis Public Service Co.. 276 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1955)

38

Glacier Land Co.. L.L.C. v. Claudia Klawe & Associates. L.L.C.,154 P.3d 852, 866
(Utah 2006)

25

Henning v. Thomas. 366 S.E.2d 109 (Va. 1988)

38

Herbold v. Ford Motor Co.. 221 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1949)

37

In re Young. 984 P.2d 997 (Utah 1999)

48

Lounsburvv.Capel. 836P.2d 188, 198 (Utah 1992)

26

State v.Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

6, 7

State v. Woolev. 810 P.2d 440 (Utah 1991)

18,24

Sullivan v.Rixev 403 S.E.2d 346 (Va. 1991)

38

Westv.Hollev. 103 P.3d 708 (Utah 2004)

17,24

Depew v. Sullivan. 71 P.3d601 (Utah 2003)

18,19

State v. King. No. 20060988 (filed August 5, 2008, unpublished)

19,25

State v. Saunders. 992 P.2d951 (Utah 1999)

18,19

Johnson v. Armontrout, 961 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1992)

19

State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984)

19

Dikeou v. Osborn. 881 P.2d943, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

36

State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 338, 397-398 (Utah 1989)

36,45

Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 479
(1st Cir. 1997)

36,45
4

Kukuruza v. General Elec. Co.. 510 F.2d 1208. 1211-1212 (1st Cir. 1975)

36,45

Williams v. Briggs Co.. 62 F.3d 703,707-708 (5th Cir. 1995),

36, 45

Romano v. Ann and Hope Factory Outlet. Inc.. 417 A.2d 1375, 1379-1380
(RI1980)

37,45

5

Jurisdictional Statement
This is an appeal from a verdict reached at the Fourth District Court, in Provo,
Utah County, Utah, dated December 3, 2007 (Case Docket 16, attached as Ex. 2) The
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
Statement of Issues and Standard of Review
L Did the trial court commit reversible error when it ruled that Robert Kearl was
not entitled to a new trial based on juror misstatements and omissions in response
to voir dire questions, and when the Court did so without questioning the juror
about his misstatements and omissions?
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-936 (Utah 1994). This issue was preserved in court by Plaintiffs
motion for new trial on December 10, 2007 (Case Docket 16, attached as Ex. 2). The
Court denied the motion on February 20, 2008 (Case Docket 17, attached as Ex. 2).
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in determining that Defendant could
enter evidence not previously disclosed to Plaintiff or the Court, that Robert Kearl
was not entitled to a new trial and that sanctions should not be entered against
Defense Counsel based on Counsel fs misconduct, or by determining that
Plaintiff's Counsel could not argue to the jury what misconduct caused certain
evidence to be withdrawn?
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. This issue was preserved in court through Plaintiffs objection
to Defense Counsel's line of questioning using previously undisclosed evidence on
6

November 7, 2007 (Partial Tr. of Jury, R.948, p. 5, attached as Ex. 11). On November 9,
2007, Plaintiff moved that the exhibit in question be removed from juror consideration
and that the Court instruct the jury as to why the exhibit was removed and of Defense
Counsel's misconduct (Partial Tr. of Jury Trial R.948, pp. 21-24, attached as Ex. 1).
Finally, Plaintiff moved for a new trial and sanctions against Defense Counsel on
December 10, 2007 (Motion for New Trial and For Sanction R.820).
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing Dr. Craig Smith to testify,
and by not allowing Plaintiff to tell the jury that Colorado Casualty Insurance
hired defense expert Dr. Craig Smith?
This issue presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. This issue was preserved in Court on October 12,2007,
through Plaintiffs Motion in Limine objecting to the testimony of Dr. Smith and
requesting permission to reveal evidence to the jury that Colorado Casualty Insurance
hired Dr. Craig Smith (R. 400).
4. Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to enter its disqualification
after holding an ex parte meeting with Defense Counsel during the trial?
This issue presents a question of law that is reviewed f6r correctness. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. This issue was preserved in Court through Plaintiffs Motion
that the Court Enter a Disqualification on February 22, 2008, and Withdrawal of Motion
to Enter Disqualification and request that the Court enter disqualification on its own
motion on March 3, 2008 (R. 881, 928).
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Constitutional or Statutory Provisions
Utah Code Annotated, §58-60-113:
Evidentiary privilege for mental health therapists regarding admissibility of an
confidential communication in .. .civil.. .proceedings is in accordance with Rule
506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59: New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following
causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order
of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47: Jurors.
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is selected an oath must be administered to
the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the
matter in issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the
evidence and the instructions of the court.
(1) Communication with jurors. There shall be no off-the-record communication
between jurors and lawyers, parties, witnesses or persons acting on their behalf.
8

Jurors shall not communicate with any person regarding a subject of the trial.
Jurors may communicate with court personnel and among themselves about topics
other than a subject of the trial. It is the duty of jurors Hot to form or express an
opinion regarding a subject of the trial except during deliberation. The judge shall
so admonish the jury at the beginning of trial and remind them as appropriate.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37: Failure to make or cooperate in discovery;
sanctions.
(b) Failure to comply with order
(b)(2) Sanctions by Court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an
order entered under Rule 16(b) [pretrial orders] .. .the Court in which the action is
pending may take such action in regard to the failure as are just, including the
following:
(b)(2)(A) deem the matter or any other facts to be established for the purposes of
the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order:
(b)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated
claims or defenses or from introducing designated mattbrs in evidence;
(b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order
is obeyed, dismiss the action.. .or any part thereof, or render judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(B)(2)(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable attorney's expenses,
including attorney's fees, caused by the failure;
(B)(2)(E) treat the failure to obey an order.. .as contempt of court:
9

(B)(2)(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference.
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other
material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response
to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use
the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In
addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action
authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).
Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice
Chapter 13. Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4: Fairness to Opposing Party
and Counsel:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence.. .or conceal a document
or other material having potential evidentiary value.
(b) falsify evidence,...
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 506: Physician and mental health therapist-patient
(b) General Rule of Privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence
and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a privilege,
during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
10

disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician
or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the
patient***
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, or
the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was the physician or
mental health therapist at the time of the communication is presumed to have
authority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the
patient.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 411: Liability Insurance.
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible
upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This
rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when
offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, Ownership, or control, or
bias or prejudice of a witness.
Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Part II. Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice
Chapter 12. Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently
(B) Adjudicative Responsibilities
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice... A judge
should be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial.
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(7).. .Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and
shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or
impending proceeding***
(E) Disqualification
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances
where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's
lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
Statement of the Case
A.

Course Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court
This case involves the claim of Plaintiff Robert Kearl for injuries he received

while helping Defendant Ray Okelberry move a trailer on Mr. Okelberry's property. A
jury found against Plaintiff on November 9, 2007, and the Court entered a judgment for
no cause of action on December 3, 2007 (Case Docket, R. 801, attached as Ex. 2).
Plaintiff moved for new trial due to the above mentioned errors and the Court ruled
against the motion on December 10, 2007 (Case Docket, attached as Ex. 2). This timely
appeal by the Plaintiff followed.
B.

Statement of the Facts
This case arises out of a personal injury claim filed by appellant, Mr. Robert Kearl,

against appellee, Mr. Ray Okelberry, for injuries Mr. Kearl sustained while Mr. Kearl
12

was assisting Mr. Okelberry in moving Mr. Okelberry's trailer out of Mr. Okelberry's
garage on September 8, 2001 (Mem. in Supp. to PL's Mot. in Limine, 7 Sept. 2007, R. at
278).
Mr. Kearl was injured when the jack used to support, raise, and lower the tongue
of a trailer during hitching and storage of the trailer suddenly released, dropping the
trailer on Mr. Kearl's bent left knee which pushed his leg bone down into his ankle and
foot and drove his ankle into the ground causing a "crush injury to his ankle and foot"
(Mem. in Supp., R. at 279). At issue in the case was what caused the trailer jack to
release; Mr. Okelberry claimed he saw Mr. Kearl pull the pin, but given the nature of Mr.
Kearl's injuries, both expert witnesses testified that it was not possible for Mr. Kearl to
pull the pin as described by Mr. Okelberry and injure his left knee because his left knee
would have been away from the trailer rather than next to the trailer. Mr. Kearl thought
that Mr. Okelberry released the jack, because he was by the jack and the trailer fell
suddenly without warning, though he did not watch him do it. The jack would not fall
without someone releasing it when it is brand new.
Because of the injury Mr. Kearl suffered, he accrued substantial medical bills and
lost wages. Also due to his injury, Mr. Kearl lost the ability tp participate in many
outdoor activities that he enjoyed with his children, including riding motor bikes and
playing sports like football and basketball. He also suffers intense pain in his knee and
ankle that will progressively worsen with time. On 18 May 2005, Mr. Kearl brought suit
against Mr. Okelberry to recover for his damages (Compl. and Jury Req., R. at 2).
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Summary of Argument
Throughout the proceedings of the trial, the Court perpetuated numerous
reversible errors, the first being the harboring of biased jurors. At the conclusion of the
trial, Kay Armstrong, the jury foreman, reported that jury member, W. Gary Harward,
voted against Plaintiff simply because Plaintiff did not conduct his life in accordance to
Harward's religious ideals (Armstrong Aff, R. at 813, attached as Ex. 3). Armstrong
reports that Harward refused to consider the evidence presented during the trial, and
Harward claimed that he had outside "help" in reaching his decision. Ms. Armstrong was
shocked by Mr. Harward's level of prejudice.
Furthermore, the Court refused to take special, post-trial actions to investigate Mr.
Harward's bias. Instead, the Court ignored Ms. Armstrong's testimony and relied solely
on Mr. Harward's obviously false voir dire statements, when he promised to fulfill his
duties impartially and without bias (Two Orders Den. Mot. for New Trial, 12 Mar. 2008,
R. at 930-35, attached as Ex. 4).
Second, the Court allowed Defendant to enter evidence previously concealed from
Plaintiff and the Court, and the Court failed to administer proper sanctions against
Defense Counsel in remedy of Counsel's blatant misconduct. Despite the Court's pretrial
order requiring disclosure before trial of all exhibits, in an attempt to surprise Plaintiff,
Defense Counsel used evidence against Plaintiffs witness that was not disclosed at any
time - including at trial - before it was used (Partial Tr. of Jury Trial, R. 948, pp. 21-24
attached as Ex. 1). However, along with violating the very purpose of discovery to
eliminate trickery and surprise during trial, Defense Counsel's use of this evidence was
14

itself illegal. Defense obtained and reviewed confidential medical records without
permission. Counsel had not received permission from the owners of those records to
view them herself or use them and show them to others and thus Counsel violated those
patients5 rights to privacy set forth in U.C.A. §58-60-113 and in the Utah Rules of
Evidence, Rule 506 (Partial Tr. of Jury Trial, R. 948, pp. 12-20, attached as Ex. 5).
Furthermore, the extent of the Court's sanctions against Defense Counsel for their
blatant disregard of professionalism and law was a mere private chastisement (Partial Tr.
of Jury Trial, R. 948, pp. 28-29, attached as Ex. 6). The Court then removed the evidence
after it was admitted over objection, and after it sat in front of the jury during trial, and
ordered the jury to disregard it without an explanation or further sanctions (Partial Tr. of
Jury Trial, R. 948, pp. 29-30, attached as Ex. 6). The Court refused Plaintiffs motion to
reveal to the jury Defense Counsel's dishonesty, severely reducing the actual probability
that the jury would successfully disregard the illegal evidence. The jury did not know
that the evidence's introduction broke the law; the jury did nqt know why it was removed.
Third, the Court further prejudiced Plaintiff by not allowing him to show Defense
witness's potential bias as a witness hired by Defendant's insurance company. During
the trial, Defendant Okelberry gave his testimony of what happened at the time of the
injury. However, his testimony was incompatible with the actual facts of the occurrence
(see Okelberry Deposition., R. at 208-220, attached as Ex. 7). Okelberry testified at trial
that he watched Plaintiff from about four feet away kneeled by the jack and release the
jack onto himself. However, Okelberry was obviously lying because if Plaintiff kneeled
by the jack as described by Mr. Okelberry and released it, Plaihtiff s right knee would
15

have been closest to the trailer and his left knee (the knee hit by the trailer) away from the
trailer. Progressive Insurance used an expert Dr. Craig Smith to divert attention away
from Defendant's false testimony (see Smith Deposition., R. at 233-42, attached as Ex. 8).
Dr. Craig Smith, Defendant's own expert, testified that Defendant's story was impossible
and could not be true, and then gave an explanation of how he thought it happened.
Defendant Okelberry then testified on cross examination that Dr. Smith's explanation of
what happened was not true. Thus confusion arose because obviously Defendant himself
did not approve of or hire Dr. Smith because Defendant Okelberry himself said Dr.
Smith's story was false. Who then hired Dr. Smith? Since Colorado Casualty Insurance
insured Defendant, clearly Colorado Casualty found it expedient to hire Dr. Smith itself
in order to divert attention away from Defendant Okelberry's testimony which was
obviously not true. Colorado Casualty did this to avoid liability costs. However, the
Court refused to allow Plaintiff to explain who hired Dr. Smith. Instead, the Court
instructed the jury that "defense counsel" hired Dr. Smith which was misleading and
untrue as explained below.
As presented below, it is the accepted practice of numerous jurisdictions to allow
counsel to reveal an adverse witness's potential biases. However, in this case, the Court
forbade Plaintiff from revealing that Colorado Casualty hired the witness (Minute Entry
Denying Plaintiffs Motion in Limine, R. 554-555, attached as Exhibit 10 [No formal
order was signed. Plaintiff requested that a transcription of the hearing on October 24,
2007, be prepared and included in the record on appeal but was informed by the clerk that
due to equipment malfunction, no recording was made of the hearing so the only record is
16

the minute entry R. 943]). Instead, the Court ordered that Plaintiff only say that Defense
Counsel hired the witness (Court Instructs Jury that Defense Counsel hired Dr. Smith, R.
948, p.36, attached as Exhibit 9) which was a misleading statement and untrue. This
ruling prejudiced Plaintiff by denying him his right to folly examine the witness's
credibility. Further, it promoted the misconception to the jury that Defense Counsel was
so dedicated to Defendant's cause that Counsel used her own money to hire the witness.
Argument
I.

The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to ask specific voir
dire questions and give specific jury instructions and when it ruled that
Robert Kearl was not entitled to a new trial based on juror misstatements
and omissions in response to voir dire questions.
A,

Relevant Law

Under Rule 59(a)(1) the Court can order a new trial based on the "irregularity of
the proceedings of the ...jury." Under Rule 59 (a)(2) juror misconduct may be proved by
the affidavit of one of the jurors. A juror's misconduct may be challenged post-trial based
on the jurors "misstatements or omissions" during voir dire (emphasis added).
Misconduct of a juror provides a basis for a new trial. West v. ftolley, 103 P.3d 708, 710
(Ut. 2004). Utah law has adopted a two-part test which is satisfied in this case. First, the
Court must consider whether the juror fully and truthfully ansWered questions in voir dire.
Second, if not, whether the juror would have been disqualified had he answered properly.
Id. at 710. Voir dire responses evidencing bias give rise to a presumption that the juror is
biased and the juror must be dismissed unless the presumption is rebutted. Id. at 711.
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Each juror must consider the case on its merits and not what happened to the juror outside
the courtroom or prior personal experiences. Id. at 713.
Furthermore, once a juror manifests an inference of bias, it is insufficient for the
juror merely to dispel said inference by claiming that he or she is capable of fulfilling his
or her duties impartially. In such a situation the court must take special action to
determine the juror's potential partiality. Id^ at 711. In State v. Woolev, 810 P.2d 440
(Utah 1991), the Court ruled accordingly, saying:
When an inference of bias is raised, the inference is generally not rebutted
simply by a subsequent general statement by the juror that he or she can be
fair and impartial. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[a] statement made by
a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial loses much of its meaning in
light of other testimony and facts which suggest a bias." Accordingly, u[t]he
court, not the juror, must determine a juror's qualifications."
Id. at 445 (citations omitted).
In fact, there are many cases where the Court has deemed that insufficient voir
dire concerning acknowledged or even possible juror bias necessitates action by the court
to remedy the situation by ordering a new trial. For instance, in Depew v. Sullivan, 71
P.3d 601 (Utah 2003) the Court found that a trial court abuses its discretion when its does
not undertake special actions to determine a jury member's bias if bias has been
suspected. They said:
Due to the strong interest in enabling parties "to elicit necessary information
for ferreting out bias," State v. Saunders. 992 P.2d 951, a trial court's discretion is most broad when it is exercised with respect to questions that have
no apparent link to any potential bias. However, the trial judge's discretion
narrows to the extent that questions do have some possible link to possible
bias, and when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the existence of an
actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must allow such
inquiries.
18

Depew, 71 P.3d at 606. The Court goes on to say that in such instances of
suspected bias, general questions that do not probe sufficiently into a veniremen's
potential bias are insufficient.
As noted, the trial court, upon rejecting Plaintiffs proposed question, did
ask the venire panel a substitute question in its place: "Would the fact that...
the defendant ] is on a religious mission at the present time give you any
problem in applying the facts in the law as you find it from the evidence in
this case?" Defendant argues that this "broader question addressed the real
issue-whether the jurors had any bias for or against... [the Church's]
missionaries. When the jurors responded in the negative, no further
questioning was necessary."
Indeed, the court's question did "address the real issue." However, to say
the question went far enough in eliciting the information Plaintiff was
entitled to get "suggests an unwarranted naivety regarding human nature....
It is unrealistic to expect that any but the most sensitive and thoughtful
jurors ... will have the personal insight, candor and openness to raise their
hands in court and declare themselves biased." State v. Ball 685 P.2d 1055,
1058 (Utah 1984).
Depew71P.3dat610.
Utah courts have taken great care to insure that its juries are impartial and that trial
courts conduct a sufficient voir dire. Most recently in State v« King, No. 20060988,
Supreme Court of Utah (filed August 5, 2008- unpublished), the Court said, "A defendant
who is convicted of a crime by a jury comprised of even one member who has exhibited
actual bias is entitled to a new trial. " King, No. 20060988 at 16-17 (citation omitted).
For other similar cases where the Court has awarded a new trial for a trial court's
insufficient or limited voir dire, see State v. Saunders, 992 P.^d 951 (Utah 1999),
Johnson v. Armontrout 961 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1992), and State v. Ball 685 P.2d 1055
(Utah 1984).
19

Finally, in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, we read about the oath each
juror must take before serving on the jury. Section (h) states that each juror must "render
a true verdict according to the evidence and the instructions of the court." According to
section (i), a juror promises to "not communicate with any person regarding a subject of
the trial," and it is the "duty of jurors not to form or express an opinion regarding a
subject of the trial except during deliberation."
B.

Facts of the Case

Plaintiff requested that the Court ask specific voir dire questions regarding
religious bias, and bias against someone who drinks alcohol. (Plaintiffs amended
proposed jury questionnaire, questions 61 and 65, R. 566).l Defendant objected to
proposed questionnaire no. 65 regarding alcohol arguing that "a juror's feelings about the
use of alcohol are irrelevant [to] .. .impartiality" and such a question would lead to a
"biased" and "unfair" jury. (Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Amended Proposed Jury
Questionnaire, R. 734-735). The Court decided to ask more general voir dire questions.
During voir dire, the Court gave the jurors a questionnaire which stated that its purpose
was to "select a fair and impartial jury" and each juror was called upon to discuss with
the judge any "valid reason that would make it difficult... to serve as a juror." In private
discussion among Mr. Harward, the Court, and counsel, Mr. Harward promised that he

Plaintiff anticipated that alcohol might be part of the case, because Dr. Clegg, Mr.
Kearl's podiatrist, testified in his deposition that people often "self medicate" chronic
pain with alcohol, as Mr. Kearl seemed to be doing. In this manner "self medication"
became an issue at trial.
20

would listen to the evidence, make a decision based on the evidence, and that he would
be "fair and impartial." (Partial Tr. of Jury Trial R. 948, pp. 3-4 attached as Ex. 12).
However, Mr. Harward's statements to the Court and Counsel were untrue. He
did not act impartially and he did not base his decision on the evidence and the law. Ms.
Kay Armstrong, the foreman of the jury, testifies in her affidavit that she "saw prejudice
on the part of more than one juror," especially from Mr. Harward (Armstrong Aff., R. at
813, attached as Ex. 3). Mr. Harward came to the jury room with his mind made up (Id.).
He felt that Plaintiff deserved the injury he received because Plaintiff conducted his life
contrary to Mr. Harward's religious beliefs (Id. at 812) because Plaintiff drank alcohol
and violated some of Mr. Harward's "other religious beliefs.'* Ms. Armstrong explains
that Mr. Harward refused to examine the case based on the evidence and simply voted
against Plaintiff because of his lifestyle (Id.). Ms. Armstrong also reports that Mr.
Harward strove successfully to convince other jury members to oppose Plaintiff on the
same grounds and that others shared Mr. Harward's bias (Id.). When questioned about
his method of reaching his verdict in a phone call with Plaintiffs Counsel after the trial,
Mr. Harward simply responded that he had "help" in making his decision (Aff. of Denton
Hatch, R. at 805, attached as Ex. 13).2

2

Upon entering the jury room, Mr. Harward showed strong leadership when he
asked all jurors to join in prayer. The jurors complied and gathered around and Mr.
Harward offered the prayer for them. This was an attempt by Mr. Harward to round up
the jurors and herd them into his religious approach to the case at the very beginning.
Plaintiff presumes that the "help" Mr. Harward said he received was referring to help
from God. Defendant cited cases in his post trial memorandum opposing the motion for a
new trial, where inspiration received by a juror has in the past been found appropriate by
Utah Courts. (Motion to Strike Affidavits, R. 832). However, inspiration from God that
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Plaintiff also requested a jury instruction explaining that the use of alcohol
cannot prejudice Plaintiff, but may be considered a pre-existing condition which could
worsen or exacerbate Mr. Kearl's damages if Mr. Kearl's use of alcohol increases or
becomes excessive when he "self medicates" his chronic pain caused by the injury.
(Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions, p. 18, R. 584). Again Defendant objected to the
instruction arguing that it was "up to the jury to decide... what qualifies as a pre-existing
condition" and Plaintiffs proposed instruction that states that drinking alcohol may be a
pre-existing condition was "self-serving and invades the province of the jury."
(Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs Instructions, R. 724). Again, the Court chose to
give more general instructions and did not address the issue of alcohol directly. (R. 770784). During trial, Plaintiff entered an exception to the Court's decision regarding jury
instructions, including the Court's failure to address alcohol directly as a pre-existing
condition. (Partial Trial Transcript, R. 948, pp. 26-27).
Despite receiving testimony from the jury foreman of Mr. Harward's professed
prejudice, the Court did not question Mr. Harward regarding his prejudice or take any
special action. Ultimately, as explained below, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion for a
new trial (Case Docket 17, attached as Ex. 2).

says "Don't consider the evidence," which seems to be what happened in this case, is not
appropriate. If the "help" was from another source, such as a friend, family member,
newspaper, or any outside source, it was also improper and contrary to the Court's
instruction to consider the evidence only and obtain no outside help. The Trial Court
refused to talk to Mr. Harward after the trial so the type or types of "help" Mr. Harward
got were not clarified.
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C.

Duty to Marshal the Evidence

The appellant has a duty to marshal the evidence in support of the Court's ruling.
We now examine evidence marshaled in favor of the Court's decision. The Court said in
its ruling that it gave the benefit of the doubt to the veracity of Ms. Armstrong's affidavit
concerning the juror in question, Mr. Harward. If Ms. Armstrong's affidavit is true,
argues the Court, then Mr. Harward folded his arms and refused to discuss the trial with
any other jury member. Because of his non-communication with the other jurors, Mr.
Harward could not have possibly had any persuasive affect on anyone else in the jury and
the idea that he swayed other jurors to vote in accordance with his alleged bias is
mistaken (Two Orders Den. Mot. for New Trial, R. at 931-32, attached as Ex. 4).
Furthermore, the Court found that since six jurors after several hours of
deliberation found against the Plaintiff, and Mr. Harward's alleged bias did not change
the outcome of the jury's decision. Plaintiff had a fair trial. There were six jurors voting
in favor of Defendant which is the number required by law (Order Den. Mot. for New
Trial, R. at 931, attached as Ex. 4).
D.

Analysis

The Court's reasoning for denying the Plaintiffs motion for a new trial is
critically flawed due to their erroneous interpretation of Ms. Armstrong's affidavit.
When Ms. Armstrong testified that Mr. Harward folded his arms to the rest of the jury,
she did not mean that he refused to discuss his position with the other jurors, but she
meant that he refused to listen to any of the arguments against his position from the other
jurors (Armstrong Aff., R. at 812, attached as Ex. 3). He refused to change his beliefs
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regardless of the evidence presented or the reasoning from the other jurors. It is apparent
that Ms. Armstrong had this meaning in mind because we see later on in her affidavit that
she clearly states that Mr. Harward openly sought to convince others of his bias (Id.).
Mr. Harward5s leadership and active attempts to sway others to his position
inherently voids the second portion of the Court's argument, since it is impossible to
know how much effect Mr. Harward had on the opinion of the other jurors. Had Mr.
Harward been removed during voir dire, had his biased influence been detected, the
jurors could very well have voted differently. Further, if the Court assumes Ms.
Armstrong's affidavit is true, then the affidavit is true when she said that she saw
"prejudice on the part of more than one juror" (IdL at 813). It is also true that
"assumptions" were not necessary. The Court should have set a hearing to inquire into
Mr. Harward's prejudice and prejudice of other jurors.
Further, Mr. Harward was one of the six votes needed for a verdict. Without his
vote there would only have been five voting against Plaintiff which would not have been
enough for a verdict against Plaintiff. Thus, assuming arguendo, that Mr. Harward did
not sway another juror, his vote alone taints the verdict.
Therefore, based on the above-cited statutes and the testimony from Ms.
Armstrong, Plaintiff merits a new trial. As found in Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court can order a new trial based on irregularities in proceedings within
the jury. However, the Court refused to grant Plaintiff this right. Due to Mr. Harward's
prejudice, Plaintiff was denied his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. As explained
in West and Wooley and the myriad of other cases cited above, the Court must take
24

special measures to insure impartiality of a juror when that juror has raised inferences of
prejudice. Despite Ms. Armstrong's testimony, the Court took no special action to
investigate Mr. Harward's bias. And as explained in King, even one impartial juror
necessitates a new trial. Finally, Mr. Harward clearly violated the juror's oath in that he
did not render a verdict based on evidence and that he acquired "help" from an extrajudicial source in forming his decision (Aff. of Denton Hatch|, R. at 805, attached as Ex.
13).
II.

The Trial Court erred in determining that sanctions should not be entered
against Defense Counsel based on Counsel's misconduct and by determining
that Plaintiff's Counsel could not argue to the jury What misconduct caused
the evidence to be withdrawn.
A.

Relevant Law

A separate basis for Plaintiffs motion for a new trial is found in Rule 59(a)(1),
which condemns irregularity in the proceedings and conduct of an adverse party. A
lawyer shall not "knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for
an open refusal based on an assertion that no obligation exists." Further, an attorney shall
not".. .unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence...., falsify evidence.. .(or)
knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal" Utah R. of Prof 1 Conduct
3.4(a)-(c).
According to Glacier Land Co., L.L.C. v. Claudia Klawe & Associates, L.L.C., 154
P.3d 852, 866 (Utah 2006), "one of the primary goals of the discovery process is 4to
remove elements of surprise or trickery.'" If a party fails to disclose a document which it
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intends to use at trial, that document shall not be permitted to be used, and in addition the
Court may do any of the following: award costs and fees, "inform the jury of the failure to
disclose," strike defenses, find facts in the action against the offending party, strike
pleadings, or enter default against the offending party. Utah R. of Civ. P. 37(f).
Utah Code Annotated 58-60-113 and Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 506, govern
use of mental health care records at trial. A patient has the privilege to refuse to disclose
or prevent the disclosure of any information regarding his or her mental health medical
records, examinations, or treatments. Accordingly, Utah Courts have ruled that, "A
patient has a right of privacy as regards to his or her own medical care." Lounsbury v.
Capel 836 P.2d 188, 198 (Utah 1992).
B.

Facts of the Case

Defense Counsel, Ruth Shapiro, deceived the Court and Plaintiffs Counsel by
presenting to the jury evidence without prior disclosure, and, even worse, by literally
hiding the evidence she would present until it was disclosed to the jury. When Defendant
presented the item of evidence to Plaintiffs Counsel and to the Court just before
questioning a witness at trial, Defendant's Counsel hid part of the exhibit. Plaintiffs
counsel objected to the entire exhibit on the grounds that he had never seen it before. At
the time of the objection, Plaintiffs Counsel did not know that some of the exhibit was
still hidden. The Court ruled that the exhibit could be admitted even though there was no
prior disclosure. (Partial trial transcript R at 948, p.5, attached as Exhibit 11). The exhibit
was then presented to the jury at which time Defendant's Counsel took off the covering

26

and showed the exhibit including the hidden portion to the jury before it was shown to
either the Court or opposing Counsel.
It all happened so fast that the Judge did not address the hidden part of the exhibit
until the next day. When it came to light through Plaintiffs objection that some of the
exhibit was hidden from the Court and opposing counsel, the Judge himself said he was
"stunned" and "taken back" when he saw how the exhibit was used. He said the conduct
of Ms. Shapiro was "deceptive in nature," "inappropriate," and "wrong" because part of
the exhibit was "hidden" from the Court and from Plaintiffs Counsel. The Court also
said there was "no way for Mr. Hatch to know what was on it. I (the Court) had no way
to know what was going to happen until it happened *** because the full exhibit was
hidden from me (the Court), [and] the full exhibit was hidden from Mr. Hatch." (Partial
trial transcript R. at 948, pp. 16-19, attached as Exhibit 5).
Ms. Shapiro used the exhibit to cross examine Dr. Ronald France, one of
Plaintiffs damage experts. Since Dr. France had not seen the exhibit before, he was
caught off guard and surprised and struggled to respond to questions from Ms. Shapiro
about the exhibit. He did not look prepared because he wasn't prepared, and he looked
incompetent because the exhibits contained a summary of many medical records which
he was asked to respond to without any preparation. He was asked to address literally
hundreds of pages of records and to compare his recommendations for several patients
which he could not do instantly without notice or preparation, and then to say whether Ms.
Shapiro's summary was accurate, all of which he could have addressed properly with
preparation. He could only answer that Ms. Shapiro's summary "seems to be accurate"
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and "they look accurate as far as I can tell." He was allowed to see the jury exhibit for
only a few moments when he was asked to walk down and look and then was asked to
state that it was accurate. Plaintiffs Counsel also objected to the medical records which
Defense Counsel passed out at the same time on the grounds that the records weren't
provided prior to trial (Defense Counsel, Ruth Shapiro, passed out to Plaintiff and the
Court for the first time 100-200 pages of unredacted medical records of patients unrelated
to Plaintiff at the same time she presented her surprise summary exhibit to the jury all of
which were marked "confidential" and use only with "permission" on the first page) and
the Court overruled the objection. (Partial Trial Transcript R. 948 p. 7, attached as
Exhibit 11). Dr. France had seen the reports in the past when he prepared them but had
not reviewed them in preparation for trial because they were related to other patients and
he did not know they were going to be used. In addition, each report was an estimated
40-50 pages in length, and no one including Dr. France could meaningfully compare
them or analyze them without notice and preparation.
The records were treatment plans prepared by Dr. Ronald France which Defense
Counsel somehow obtained from other files in her office.

Each set of records stated in

italics on the front page "This report contains confidential information that is protected
by law (Utah Code Ann. 58-60-l-l-(l)) and must not be shared with any person without
the written consent of the patient or a person legally appointed as power of attorney for
the patient." See also Utah Code Annotated 58-60-113 and Rule of Evidence 506. Each
3

Ruth Shapiro obtained the confidential documents from another case she handled
(see Letter, July 29, 2008).
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report contained personal and medical history, numerous psychological tests with
answers, and detailed questionnaires about every aspect of the patient's personal life with
answers. In other words, highly sensitive and personal information which no patient
wants revealed to unknown persons. In addition to reading the reports herself, when she
passed out unredacted copies of the reports at trial to Plaintiffs Counsel and the Court
she perpetuated and broadened the unauthorized use of them. In doing so, Defendant's
Counsel intentionally violated Rule 506 and Section 58-60-113 and caused others to
violate the law.
Defense Counsel did not disclose the exhibit and documents ahead of time as
ordered by the Court in its pretrial order (Parties ordered to exchange exhibits by October
6,2007. R. 158). If Defendant had disclosed the exhibit as ordered, Plaintiffs expert
would have been prepared to answer questions about it and cqnfidentiality would have
been preserved.4 But this is the reason why she did not disclose it. Defense Counsel
thought the element of surprise, and the powerful effect the evidence would have on the
jury, was worth violating the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This decision by Defense
Counsel was so brazen and so out-of-bounds that it cannot be ignored. Nevertheless,
Defense Counsel appeared to the jury to have a Perry Mason-like command of the court
room. The jury was surely impressed. Meanwhile, Dr. France and Plaintiffs Counsel

Ms. Shapiro obviously anticipated using the information in advance of trial.
Before presenting the exhibit at trial, she gathered the records from other files, sifted
through them, summarized them on a chart, copied all of the reports to hand out at trial,
and then put a blow up of the chart on foam board.
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appeared to be the opposite, groping and stumbling as they tried to understand what was
happening.
Defense Counsel, Ruth Shapiro, argued that she only put initials on the exhibit and
did not use full names. This is immaterial. As stated above, she was not entitled to have
those records herself and she could not lawfully pass them out to others at trial in the way
she did.5 Defense Counsel's partial, but ineffective, attempt to protect confidentiality by
using the initials of patients on the summary board shows she knew they were
confidential, but she failed to protect confidentiality. Ms. Shapiro did all this knowingly.
Karen Green, who is also a client of Plaintiff s Counsel, Denton Hatch, was one of
the persons whose treatment plan was misused. Karen Green did not give permission for
disclosure of her confidential information (see Aff. of Karen Green, R. at 808) and was
offended that it was read and used by Ms. Shaprio without her permission. This violation
was for personal gain: Ruth Shapiro's personal gain, and her client's personal gain, if she
won the trial.
When the judge learned of Ms. Shapiro's trickery, he told her it was deceptive
(outside of the presence of the jury) and withdrew the exhibit. Plaintiff argued that he
should be allowed to explain to the jury why the exhibit was removed and point out

5

The night after the exhibit was entered into evidence, Plaintiffs Counsel
contacted Karen Green to confirm that she did not give permission for her medical
records to be used in another case. Karen Green was angry and upset and requested that
a motion be made which Plaintiffs Counsel made the following day. If Ruth Shapiro
had not handed out unredacted copies of the records, Plaintiffs Counsel would not have
known who to contact.
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Defendant's dishonesty. However, the Court prohibited any explanation to the jury as to
why the exhibit was removed and merely instructed the jury to ignore the evidence.
C.

Duty to Marshal the Evidence

To understand the Court's reason for reaching its decision to deny Plaintiffs
Motion for New Trial based on counsel misconduct, we examine evidence marshaled in
favor of the Court's decision. First, the exhibit in question was based solely on damages
and not on liability. Dr. France's testimony sought to establish the depth of Plaintiff s
injury and Defense Counsel used the exhibit to challenge Dr. France's evaluation of
Plaintiffs damages. Neither Dr. France's testimony, nor Defense's exhibit focused on
the liability of the Defendant. Therefore, because the jury was instructed to determine
Defendant's liability first and to evaluate the extent of Plaintiff s damages only if they
found Defendant liable, the exhibit was ultimately irrelevant since the jury found
Defendant not liable. The exhibit did not seek to prove Defendant's liability, so whether
or not the jury considered the exhibit even after being told to disregard it is completely
moot (Order Denying Motion for New Trial, 12 Mar. 2008, R, at 931, attached as Ex. 4).
Second, the jury did not know the names of the patients which were the subject of the
reports so confidentiality was not breached with the jury. Third, Defendant argued that
the evidence was for rebuttal and did not need to be disclosed in advance, and the records
were also reports prepared by Dr. France so he did not need preparation and it was
appropriate to ask Dr. France about them. (Partial Trial Transcript, R. 958 p. 5). Last,
Defense Counsel, after showing the unhidden part of the exhibit to the Court and
Plaintiffs Counsel and after the exhibit was received by the Court, and as she was
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walking up to the podium to present the exhibit to the jury, turned to the Court and gave
the Court a warning that she was about to disclose a hidden part of the exhibit. She said,
"In all fairness, your Honor, there is more information underneath that I am going to get
into." (Partial Trial Transcript, R. 948 p. 5).
D.

Analysis

The Court's argument in defense of its decision is insufficient for several major
reasons. First, the Court's argument fails to consider the effect of surprise. More
important than the content of the exhibit is the way an ambush makes the witness appear.
Dr. France's testimony was not only meant to show that Plaintiff was injured, but that he
was greatly injured. This has the purpose of establishing in the jurors' minds the gravity
of the case in which they are a part. When Dr. France appears to hesitate, or be
unprepared, or incompetent, or unbelievable because of an ambush, his credibility is
damaged and Plaintiffs entire case is damaged even though Dr. France is a damage
witness, because in the jury's eyes Dr. France is part of the Defendant's case and his
failure can taint Plaintiffs case. The message which the jury receives is not just in words
but in the facial reactions and body language of the witness. Therefore, the effect of the
surprise cannot be understood from reviewing the written word of the trial record alone.
Dr. France was asked to compare other reports he prepared with the one he did in
this case. This is probably appropriate if done by the rules, but if the witnesses are
questioned about hundreds of pages, even though they are his records, without
preparation he will fumble for answers to questions. Dr. France would have testified
differently if he had been given notice of the exhibit. The exhibit used to impeach Dr.
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France could make the jury think that the doctor was blowing Plaintiffs injuries
completely out of proportion and that the Plaintiff brought a frivolous civil suit against
Defendant. If Defense Counsel was successful in impeachment of Dr. France, the jury
would think of the Defendant as another victim of a frivolous lawsuit. Thus, because of
the exhibit and the way it was used, the jury became more inclined to favor the Defendant
as the victim.
The Court concluded that since the exhibit did not deal with Defendant's liability,
it was irrelevant to the jury's verdict. However, clearly such is not the case. Plaintiff
argues that even though the jury was ordered to forget the exhibit, it is impossible to fully
evaluate the extent of the exhibit's influence on the jury's decision-making. Once the
jury had seen this information and heard the testimony connected with it, it was not
possible to remove it from the jury's mind, even though the Court instructed the jury to
ignore it. The jury did not know why the exhibit was withdrawn, nor did they know why
they should ignore it. (Partial Trial Transcript, R. 948 p. 21-24, 28, attached as Exhibit J).
If the Court had told the jury about Defendant's dishonesty it would have removed
prejudice against Plaintiff, prevented Defendant's Counsel to act dishonestly with
impunity, and placed blame where it should be.
In addition, the Court's decision completely skirted a major reason for Plaintiffs
Motion for New Trial: Defense Counsel broke the law. As mentioned previously, the
exhibit used by Defense Counsel utilized private medical information without the
permission of its owners. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59, says that a new trial is
to be granted for irregularity in the trial proceedings by the Court or by an adverse party.
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Plaintiff argues that Defense Counsel's illegal actions certainly qualify as an irregularity
in trial proceeding. The Court failed to address this violation in justifying its decision.
Therefore, because of Defense Counsel's blatant trickery and trying to "surprise"
the Court and Counsel by using undisclosed evidence; because of Defense Counsel's
illegal use of medical records without permission of their owners; and, because of the
Court's passive/non-existent sanction against Defense Counsel and failure to sufficiently
instruct the jury on the dishonest use of the exhibit, Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. It is
injustice for such a blatant violation of the law and Rule of Procedure to result in any
benefits or reward for the Defendant. Clearly in this situation the Court must error on the
side of protecting Plaintiff and the Justice System from such blatant dishonesty which is
inconsistent with the spirit of the concept of justice.
Defendant also argued that the exhibit was a "rebuttal exhibit" and did not need to
be disclosed. This was not so much a rebuttal exhibit as a cross examination exhibit
which Defendant prepared well in advance of trial. It took some time to gather the
confidential records, summarize them, copy all of them for use at trial, and put the
summary on a foam board for the jury. There is no reason why this exhibit could not
have been disclosed, and Defense Counsel has never attempted to give a reason why it
was not disclosed other than she didn't think she was required to disclose it. But in
summary, there are multiple reasons why the exhibit should have been disclosed
including the Court's pretrial order requiring exhibits to be disclosed to the opposing
party, violation of the law and the Rules of Procedure, avoiding ambush and surprise to
the witness, and protection of confidential medical records.
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Last, just before Defense Counsel revealed the hidden part of the exhibit to the
jury she gave the Court a warning, almost under her breath, that she was about to do so.
This does not suffice as a proper disclosure even though it was given before, albeit
seconds, it was used as an exhibit. The Court at that point had already received the
exhibit and probably had no idea what she meant when she said she had something
"underneath." It does show that she knew what she was doing. She acted intentionally.
The foam board exhibit had a blank sheet of paper taped to it when it was shown to the
Court and to counsel so that the paper could not be lifted. It appeared that the paper had
nothing under it because it was taped securely down and so it appeared that it would be
used for writing or nothing at all. There was other writing which was visible on the
exhibit to which Plaintiff objected. Defense Counsel's last second "disclosure" was also
"deceptive in nature" shows that she knew she had hidden something when she presented
the exhibit to Court and Counsel and she knew she should reveal it. No rational judge
would normally expect a trained attorney to announce she was going to give something to
the jury that she hid from the Court. Such behavior is such a departure from the Rules
that the Court would probably not understand the statement. In this case the Court
probably did not know what she was talking about and did not address it until the
following day when the issue was raised by Plaintiff. In the end, Defense Counsel's lastsecond-one-sentence "in all fairness" disclosure was really a disclosure that she
intentionally hid the information from the Court and Counsel.
III.

The Trial Court erred by allowing Dr. Craig Smith to testify without allowing
Plaintiff to tell the jury that Colorado Casualty Insurance hired Dr. Smith.
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A.

Relevant Law...
1.

...Concerning the Admissibility of Dr. Smith's Testimony.

In Utah, a witness who is "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill experience,
training, or education" may testify as to specialized knowledge if such testimony will
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Utah R.
of Evid. 702. Under this rule, the district court is given discretion to "determine the
admissibility of expert testimony, and to determine if the witness is qualified to give an
opinion on a particular matter." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (citation omitted). All admissible expert testimony has to be reliable, relevant, and
helpful to the trier of fact. "Evidence not to be reliable cannot as a matter of law, assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue and, therefore
is inadmissible." State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 338, 397-398 (Utah 1989) (citation
omitted).
Where a product is tested there must be sufficient evidence that it was in
substantially the same condition—in all relevant respects—when tested as it was at the
time of the injury. See Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 104 F.3d 472,
479 (1 st Cir. 1997) (evidence of testing auto after 18 months excluded) citing Kukuruza v.
General Elec. Co., 510 F.2d 1208,1211-1212 (1 st Cir. 1975) (requiring a showing of the
product's condition at the time of the injury and the time of the inspection); Williams v.
Briggs Co., 62 F.3d 703, 707-708 (5th Cir. 1995) (excluding testimony about heater
malfunction where the test was conducted two years after the injury and unspecified
repairs were made); and Romano v. Ann and Hope Factory Outlet Inc., 417 A.2d 1375,
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1379-1380 (RI 1980) (exclusion of design defect testimony where the expert examined
the bicycle two years after the accident and after other experiments were performed).
2.

.. .Concerning the Admissibility of Evidence Showing that Dr.
Smith was Hired by Colorado Casualty Insurance.

Utah courts, as well as courts in other states, typically prohibit counsel from
mentioning whether or not a person is covered by insurance. This is verbalized in Utah
Rules of Evidence, Rule 411. It says:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not
admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise
wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof
of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
It is important to distinguish the second sentence of the rule from the first. It does not
forbid evidence of insurance when that evidence is offered to show an insurance
company's potential control of a witness. If an insurance company hires a witness to
testify in court on its behalf, obviously it would be expedient for the jury to know this in
order to determine that witness's credibility.
As explained in the Utah rule, there have been several cases in several other states
where courts ruled in favor of allowing counsel to disclose evidence of an adverse
witness's employment with an insurance company. For instance, in Herbold v. Ford
Motor Co., 221 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1949) the court said:
Notwithstanding the rigid rule of excluding evidence which tends to reveal
that an insurance company would have to pay any judgment obtained
against the defendant, we have ruled that, where such insurance carrier
injects itself into the case and its agent or representative testified adversely
to the interest of the plaintiff, it is competent for him to show whom the
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witness was representing since this would tend to show bias or special
interest of the witness.
Id. at 649 (citation omitted).
In Clayton v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 276 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1955), the
court reached a similar ruling. In this case, the defense attempted to convey the
perception to the jury that their expert witness was hired by the defendant, when
the witness was actually hired by the liable insurance company. The court argued
that in such an instance, it is necessary for the plaintiff to distinguish the witness
as an employee of the insurance company in order to show possible bias:
We find no error in the action of the trial court in this connection. It is
always competent, insofar as it bears upon a witness1 credibility, to show
the connection between a witness and a party to the cause... Furthermore,
the element of credibility is implicit in this situation. Having in mind the
reference which counsel for defendant made to the witness Wieland both in
the cross-examination of plaintiff and in the direct examination of Mr.
Wieland it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the jury was given
the mistaken impression that Mr. Wieland was an employee of defendant...
plaintiffs counsel had the right to correct the impression by showing that he
was never employed by the Public Service Company but was an employee
of Transit Casualty Company even though it was thereby revealed that
there was an insurance carrier in the background.
Id. at 624. For other similar rulings where courts found that it is legitimate and
prudent for counsel to show a witness's possible bias through his employment
with an insurance company, see Sullivan v. Rixey, 403 S.E.2d 346 (Va. 1991) and
Henning v. Thomas, 366 S.E.2d 109 (Va. 1988).
B.

Facts of the Case

This case law is important in considering the strategy employed by Defense
Counsel in the current case. Defendant Ray Okelberry's testimony was riddled with
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contradictions. Defendant Okelberry said he did not cause the trailer to fall on Plaintiff
Robert Kearl. Mr. Okelberry claimed he saw Mr. Kearl lift the release handle and drop
the jack on himself. Mr. Okelberry said he was four feet away and Robert Kearl was in
clear vision. However, Mr. Okelberry's story was shown to be untrue because Mr.
Kearl's left leg could not have been crushed if he was kneelirig where Mr. Okelberry said
he was. In that position Mr. Kearl's right knee, not his left knee, would have been next to
the trailer. However, Mr. Okelberry could not change his recorded story after he realized
that his account of what happened was clearly impossible.
Colorado Casualty Insurance held a large residential liability policy covering Mr.
Okelberry, and it hired Christensen, Jensen and Ruth Shapiro who are on its Defense
Counsel panel to defend Mr. Okelberry. After Defendant Ray Okelberry testified
contrary to known facts, Colorado Casualty made the decision to hire Dr. Craig Smith to
testify that Mr. Okelberry's story was incorrect and to give an alternative theory of what
happened. This was Colorado Casualty's attempt to rehabilitate Mr. Okelberry whose
story was not believable. Thus, we have Defendant's own expert saying Defendant's
story is not true, and Defendant saying his expert's opinion is not true, and no
explanation of this conflict except the Court's instruction to the jury that Defense
Counsel hired Dr. Smith (Partial Trial Transcript, R. 948, p. 3^5, attached as Exhibit 9).
There were two principal conclusions of Dr. Smith's testimony. First, he
concluded that the jack could have fallen on its own (see Op. of Craig Smith, R.125, p.3).
Dr. Smith tested the possibility of this theory by using the san^e jack from the accident
(although six years older) and by partially engaging the suppori pins for the jack. Within
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five to ten minutes, when Dr. Smith began "turning the jack handle," the jack fell (Id. at
R. 125, p.2).
The second principal conclusion of Dr. Smith's testimony dealt with the
uncertainty of Mr. Kearl's position at the time of the accident. He claims that Mr.
Kearl's injuries (i.e. the dislocation and fracturing of the bones in Mr. Kearl's left leg)
indicate that Mr. Kearl's leg was not in a vertical position when the trailer fell, contrary
to Mr. Kearl's testimony. And, because of this, there is insufficient evidence to
determine Mr. Kearl's exact position (Id. at 1-2).
Yet, with Dr. Smith's conclusions came two obvious deficiencies. First,
concerning his experiment to test the possibility that the jack could have fallen on its own,
Dr. Smith used the very same jack from the accident. At the time of the accident, the
jack was brand new, without defects (R. 285, Okelberry Dep. 31-33). When Dr. Smith
tested the jack six years later, there were numerous defects that prevented its proper
functioning, thus making it more possible that the jack would fall on its own (see Op. of
David Ingebretsen R. 302-305 and 311-314, 1-2, for an exhaustive account of how the
various safety features preventing the jack from falling on its own were bent and largely
incapable of serving their purpose when Dr. Smith tested the jack).
The second major deficiency comes by the very fact that Dr. Smith has no medical
experience. He is extremely well trained and accomplished in engineering, yet his
training in anatomical structures is limited to a single class that he took in college
concerning biomechanics. In fact, to draw his conclusion concerning the impact of the
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injuries to Mr. Kearl's leg, Dr. Smith turned to a graph of the skeletal structure that he
found on the internet. (Dep. of Craig Smith 14-21, R. 233-242).
Therefore, in light of these discrepancies, Plaintiff moVed to disqualify Dr.
Smith's testimony. Yet, the Court allowed Dr. Smith to testify. (Minute entry regarding
Ruling on Motion in Limine, R. 554-555, Exhibit 10 attache^). Plaintiff then sought to
introduce evidence to the Court that demonstrated possible control in order to impeach Dr.
Smith's testimony.
However, the Court forbade Plaintiff from showing the witness's employer
connection, thus denying Plaintiff his right to examine the witness's potential biases. The
Court denied Plaintiffs pre-trial motion and would not allow Plaintiff to tell the jurors
that the reason Dr. Craig Smith was called to say Mr. Okelberry's story was not true was
because Colorado Casualty made the decision to try to cover up Mr. Okelberry's untrue
story. Dr. Smith did testify at trial that Mr. Okelberry's story was not true, and Mr.
Okelberry testified that Dr. Smith's story was untrue. Plaintiff was ordered by the Court
to tell the jury that the reason for the discrepancy was that Defense "Counsel hired Dr.
Smith." (Partial Trial Exhibit, R. 948, p. 36, attached as Exhibit 9). Thus, the jury was
misled to think such things as the following: 1) that Defense Counsel was so passionate
about her client and thought his cause was so just that with her own money she was
willing to help her client by hiring an expert to straighten his story out; 2) that Mr.
Okelberry had little or no money; and 3) that they should feel sorry for Mr. Okelberry.
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C.

Duty to Marshal the Evidence

To understand why the Court decided against Plaintiffs Motion in Limine, we
must turn to the memorandums produced by Defendant. Unfortunately, due to technical
error, the Court was unable to produce a transcript of the pre-trial hearing concerning the
Court's decision regarding Plaintiffs Motion in Limine. For some reason the hearing
was not recorded and so could not be transcribed and included as part of the trial record.
Thus, we examine the arguments against the motion as given by the Defendant as found
in "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine" (R. at 339) and as found
in "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine RE: Colorado Casualty
Insurance" (hereinafter "Mem. Opp'n in Limine," R. at 430).
1.

Dr. Smith's testimony should be allowed.

In defending the admissibility of Dr. Smith's testimony, Defendant argued two
main points. First, they argued that the age of the jack was irrelevant in Dr. Smith's
experiment. Since he tested the possibility of the jack to fall on its own, and since he
tested its general reliability, Dr. Smith's experimentation evaluated the design of the jack.
The actual condition of the jack at the time of Dr. Smith's experiment was largely
irrelevant since he inquired into its design.
Second, according to Rules 702 and 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence an expert
is qualified by his or her "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," and
someone who qualifies according to these criteria may testify "in the form of an opinion
or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702. Under Rule 703, this testimony may be based on
"facts or data... perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing."
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Thus, according to these rules, Dr. Smith's testimony is clearly admissible since he
earned his doctorate from MIT, he taught at BYU since 1968? and he published numerous
papers. Dr. Smith is certainly considered an expert.
Finally, Defendant argues that if Dr. Smith is not allowed to testify, then Mr.
Ingebretsen (the expert witness for Plaintiff) should not be allowed to testify also. This is
because Mr. Ingebretsen conducted his examinations using the same jack used by Dr.
Smith. Further, Mr. Ingebretsen's experimentation was favorable to Plaintiffs claim.
2.

Plaintiff must not be allowed to reveal evidence concerning Dr.
Smith's employers.

Defendant argues that evidence concerning Dr. Smith's employment by Colorado
Casualty is inadmissible according to the Utah Rules of Evidetice 401,402, and 403.
Evidence regarding who retained an expert witness is irrelevant in a case dealing with
negligence and is thus inadmissible according to Rules 401 and 402. It does not help the
jury understand how the accident was caused, nor does it apply to the amount of damages
incurred by Plaintiff (Mem. Opp'n in Limine 4, R. at 427). Evidence of the fact that
Defendant was insured brings unfair prejudice against Defendant, which is prohibited by
Utah Rules of Evidence, 403 (Mem. Opp'n in Limine 4-5, R. at 426-27).
Second, evidence of a defendant's liability insurance is inadmissible under the
Utah Rules of Evidence, 411. Such evidence would create risk for defendant because
upon learning of defendant's insured status the jury "would likely be compelled to assign
more culpability to the defendants, regardless of what the evidence [reasonably] shows,
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because defendant appears to be in a better financial position to pay any damages." (Mem.
Opp'n in Limine 5, R. at 426).
D.

Analysis
1.

Defendant failed to show the admissibility of Dr. Smith's
testimony.

Defendant's argument concerning Dr. Smith's experiment and the condition of the
jack during the experiment is vague and fails to completely address the discrepancies
raised by Plaintiff. In fact, it misses completely the point Plaintiff raised in his Motion in
Limine. Dr. Smith tested the possibility of the jack to fall on its own. However, Mr.
Ingebretsen's entire evaluation of the jack showed that had the jack been working
properly as designed, it would be impossible for the jack to fall on its own. Mr.
Ingebretsen shows that it was designed with numerous safety features made to prevent
such falls. Even with human error, these safety features would keep the jack from falling
unless the release was engaged by the user.
However, these safety features had long since ceased to function by the time that
Dr. Smith conducted his experiment. Mr. Ingebretsen shows that in its new state, said
features would work as designed. But, over the six years from the time of the accident
(when the jack was brand new) to the time of Dr. Smith's experiment, the guide tubes had
become bent, the locking pins had lost their spring, and the foot of the jack rusted to the
point of no movement. These features were designed to prevent the pins from becoming
partially engaged.
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Therefore, it is because of the condition of the jack, and not the design of the jack
itself, that Dr. Smith was able to come to his conclusion. Thp condition of the jack had
so changed from the day of the accident (when it was new) to the time of the experiment
that it essentially became a different jack, one that was unable to perform the function for
which it was designed. And as the Court ruled in Rimmasch, Bogosian, Kukuruza,
Williams, and Romano, unless the product is shown to be in the same condition as the
time of accident or injury, results from tests conducted on that product are inadmissible.
Second, on the admissibility of Dr. Smith's testimony concerning injuries
sustained by Plaintiff to his left leg, Defendant made no attempt to refute Plaintiffs
argument that Dr. Smith was not qualified to give testimony on such matters. Defendant
attempted to divert the issue by showing all of Dr. Smith's accomplishments in the field
mechanical engineering, but Defendant failed to establish his expertise in medically
related areas, such as biomechanics or anatomy. Rules 702 and 703 explain that a
formally trained person may give testimony and opinion on things pertaining to his or
her area of expertise, but that does not give license to that person, once established as an
expert in one area, to give testimony on things outside of his expertise. Utah R. Evid.
702-03. Dr. Smith could not be considered an expert in biomechanics so his testimony
concerning Plaintiffs injuries should have been excluded.
Finally, Defendant again attempted to divert the issue of the admissibility of Dr.
Smith's testimony by attacking Mr. Ingebretsen's testimony, these attacks, as outlined
above, do nothing to show how Dr. Smith's testimony survives the deficiencies addressed
by Plaintiff. They were merely a feeble attempt by Defendant to draw the Court's
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attention away from the inadequacies of Dr. Smith's testimony to some imagined
shortcomings of Mr. Ingebretsen's testimony. Thus, since they do not even address the
arguments presented by Plaintiff in support of rejecting Dr. Smith's testimony, they are
irrelevant to this issue.
2.

The Court erred in not allowing evidence showing potential
control and bias.

In short, the opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to allow evidence showing
that Dr. Smith was hired by Colorado Casualty Insurance fails for several reasons. First,
Utah Rules of Evidence, 402 says that relevant evidence must have "any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to be the determination of the action
more probably or less probably than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid.
402. The "consequence" arises from Dr. Smith's testimony. He testified, essentially,
against Plaintiffs claim of negligence. Evidence showing Dr. Smith's potential bias
through his employment allows the jury to determine if his testimony is credible and,
therefore, if Plaintiff s claim of negligence is frivolous or not. Thus, this evidence is
extremely relevant to the determination of the action.
Second, concerning Defendant's objection to the motion on the grounds of its
potential of creating an unfair bias against Defendant, we look again at Rule 411 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not
admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise
wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as
proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
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Utah R. Evid. 411 (emphasis added). As has been argued previously, the evidence
of Dr. Smith's employment is necessary to show control and possible bias. These
are aspects of a witness that a jury needs to know, and are allowed under Rule 411.
That the Court rejected Plaintiffs Motion in Limine on these grounds clearly
opposes an established rule of evidence found not only in Utah, but in states across
the nation. Therefore, the Court erred grievously and further prejudiced Plaintiffs
chances at a fair trial by rejecting the evidence in question.
IV.

The Court erred by failing to enter its disqualification after holding an
ex parte meeting with Defense Counsel.
A.

Relevant Law

The Utah Code of Judicial Administration governs judicial conduct and provides
guidance to judges. Cannon 1 states that a judge should "personally observe high
standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be
preserved." Cannon 2 states that a judge should avoid the "appearance of impropriety in
all activities." Further, we read that a judge "...shall perform judicial duties without bias
or prejudice" and shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by "words or conduct
manifest bias...." Utah Code of Jud. Admin., Canon 3(B)(5). Additionally, "A judge
should be alert to avoid behavior that may be perceived to be prejudicial." Utah Code of
Jud. Admin., Canon 2(B)(5). Except as authorized by law, a judge "...shall neither initiate
nor consider, and shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a
pending or impending proceeding." Utah Code of Jud. Admin., Canon 3(B)(7). Finally,
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a judge shall enter a disqualification "in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality
may reasonably be questioned...'9 including where the judge has a "personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias concerning an
issue in the case...." Utah Code of Jud. Admin., Canon 3(E) (1) [emphasis added].
In In re Young, 984 P.2d 997 (Utah 1999), the Court considered judicial ethics as
required in the Utah Code. The case examined a judge who, before the issuance of
attorney fees, communicated his opinion of a fee issue to one of the trial's counsel. The
Court found that this ex parte communication, even though the trial proper had ended,
was in violation of judicial standards. Concerning the negative effects of this violation,
the Court said:
Regardless of whether Judge Young was actually presiding over the case at
the time of the call, he had presided over all of the prior proceedings and
should not have commented on his view of the fee issue to Hintze.
Although Judge Young may not have intended to afford any one-sided
benefit in doing so, his ex parte comments provided Hintze and the school
district with information that at the very least had the potential of giving
them an advantage in settlement negotiations.... Judge Young should have
realized the impropriety of engaging in a private conversation about a
pending issue with only one of the attorneys involved in the case.
Young, 984 P.2d at 1006. The Court goes on to say:
Regardless of whether they were able to capitalize on that information in
settlement negotiations, Judge Young jeopardized the integrity of the court
system by creating the risk for that to happen. In so doing, Judge Young
violated a fundamental tenet of our judicial system: that those who seek to
resolve their disputes in court receive fair treatment.
Id. at 1008.

48

B.

Facts of the Case

In Kearl v. Okelberry, during jury deliberations, the Court met with Defense
Counsel and Defendant ex parte to compliment Defense Counsel on her work in the case,
to state that he thought she had a strong finish, and to wish h^r good luck. Plaintiff and
Plaintiffs Counsel and the rest of the audience were out of the courtroom except for one
person who was lying in a bench out of sight who overheard the conversation: Trevor
Wenzel, the son of Plaintiff s fiance, who later testified to the above described
conversation (see Aff. of Trevor Wenzel, R. at 892-93, attached as Ex. 14).
After learning of the conversation from Mr. Wenzel, Plaintiffs Counsel decided
that action needed to be taken. But, since he entered the Motion to Enter Disqualification
against Judge Stott beyond the set deadline, Plaintiff withdrew the motion (see
Withdrawal of Mot. to Enter Disqualification (and request that the Court enter
disqualification on its own motion), R. at 928, attached as Ex. 15). The withdrawal of the
Motion to Enter Disqualification was not because Plaintiff changed his mind about the
prejudicial acts of Judge Stott, but because the motion was untimely. Therefore, in the
same withdrawal, Plaintiff formally requested that Judge Stott enter disqualification on
the Court's own motion as is codified in Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E: "A judge
shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned (emphasis added)." According to Plaintiffs interpretation of
Canon 3E, it is the responsibility of the judge to dismiss himself in situations where his or
her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Accordingly, Plaintiff left this
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responsibility on the shoulders of the Court (Withdrawal of Motion to Enter
Disqualification, R.928, attached as Exhibit 15).
However, the Court made no official response to the initial Motion for
Disqualification or to Plaintiffs later request that the Court enter disqualification on its
own motion. We assume that the Court decided it was qualified since it continued to
make decisions in the case on other matters, so to understand the Court's implicit
decision, we marshal the evidence opposing the dismissal as argued by Defendant (see
Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n to PL's Mot. that the Ct. Enter a Disqualification (hereinafter "Def.
Opp'n Dismiss"), R. at 919).
C.

Duty to Marshal the Evidence

According to Defendant, there are two principal reasons why Plaintiffs Motion
for Disqualification should be denied. First, Plaintiffs Motion is Untimely. Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 63, states that a motion to disqualify must be filed no later than
20 days after "the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is
based." (Def. Opp'n Dismiss, R. at 916). Plaintiff filed his motion on February 22, 2008,
and made his request on February 29. Therefore, Plaintiff clearly missed any timeframe
since the alleged ex parte meeting occurred on November 9, 2007.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs belated filing of his motion for dismissal was not
coincidental. In the time between November 9, 2007, and February 22, 2008, Plaintiff
actively sought relief from Judge Stott for a new trial. But when he saw that the Court
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would not yield, Plaintiff switched to his reserve strategy of having Judge Stott
disqualified (Id at 915).
Second, the Motion for Disqualification is legally insufficient. Plaintiff attempts
to show some level of judicial bias through a menial conversation between Defense
Counsel and Judge Stott. The affidavits collected from Defense Counsel and Trevor
Wenzel clearly show that the conversation between Defense Counsel and the Court was
"brief, innocuous, and did not create a reasonable exchange of bias." (Id. at 914) At most,
Mr. Wenzel's affidavit says that Judge Stott complimented Defense Counsel on her work
and said that he thought she had a strong finish. The judge concluded with "Good luck."
(Id) Neither of these statements creates a reasonable appearance of bias on the part of
Judge Stott,
D.

Analysis

The evidence presented in Defense Counsel's opposition of dismissal is
insufficient in its aim. First, as explained above, Plaintiff realizes that his motion was
filed in an untimely manner, and for this reason it was withdrawn. But, according to the
previously cited Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E, the judge himself is required
to enter the disqualification when his or her impartiality may reasonably be questioned.
Certainly, an ex parte meeting is sufficient to shake one's confidence in a judge's
impartiality. Therefore, the judge should not have waited for the Motion to be filed, but
he should have taken the responsibility upon his own shoulders and disqualified himself.
Further, Plaintiffs Counsel resents and wholeheartedly denies allegations made by
Defendant which mischaracterize Plaintiff as having used the Motion for Disqualification
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as a reserve option in case Judge Stott would not offer Plaintiff a new trial. Such a
personal attack requires a reply. Suffice it to say that the decision to call for the public
rebuke of an honored official, like Judge Stott, is a difficult one to make. Probably every
attorney hopes that he or she will never have to take such action and will avoid it if at all
possible. In thirty years of trial practice Plaintiffs Counsel has never filed a motion to
disqualify or, to the best of his recollection considered filing one, despite the fact that he
has disagreed with judicial decisions numerous times as any trial attorney will. But in
this case the bias throughout the trial was overwhelming, and this ex parte meeting was
the capstone, and after long and deep thought regarding the consequences, Plaintiffs
Counsel filed the motion. Plaintiffs attorney concluded Judge Stott's meeting with
Defense Counsel was a manifestation of the prejudice Judge Stott held throughout the
trial as manifest when he unnecessarily embarrassed and prejudiced Plaintiff and
protected Defendant, all of which have an effect on the jury as a whole. Plaintiffs
Counsel concluded after careful reflection that the meeting between Judge Stott was an
unguarded moment when Judge Stott showed his true colors because he thought he could
do it without being overheard. It was a buddy-buddy moment between the Court and
Defense Counsel.
This meeting would only be appropriate if Cannon 3B(7) were amended to read:
It is appropriate for a judge to meet alone with a party of his choice to give
a case critique and limited encouragement as long as the meeting is kept
short, and only if the judge expects that there will not be many more
motions to be decided by the judge in the case.

52

Finally, Plaintiff points out that in the entirety of Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant attempts to play down the occurrence of
the ex parte meeting as being trivial and irrelevant in nature. But Defendant never denies
that it happened. The truth of the matter is clear: Judge Stott met with Defense Counsel
and he offered her "constructive criticism" concerning her performance in the case. Ms.
Shapiro clearly admits this in her affidavit (Aff. of Ruth A. Shapiro, R. at 921-24). Ms.
Shapiro also accepts Mr. WenzePs account of what was said during the meeting, that
Judge Stott complimented Ms. Shapiro on her performance and that he thought that she
had a strong finish. (Aff. of Trevor Wenzel, R. at 892, attached as Ex. 14; Def. Opp'n
Dismiss, R. at 914). Ms. Shapiro did not affirm or deny that Judge Stott wished her
"good luck" as testified to by Mr. Wenzel. But those comments she does admit are an
unmistakable show of bias, and in any case, they clearly indicate an ex parte meeting.
Judge Stott violated Canon 3B(7) by holding an ex parte meeting with Ms. Shapiro and
discussing things pertaining to a pending case. At the very least, this ex parte meeting
with Defendant establishes sufficient evidence that the Court's "impartiality may
reasonably be questioned."
Judge Stott's response to Ruth Shapiro's request for a critique of her case should
have been "That would not be appropriate for me to do." Or he could have said, "Let's
get Plaintiffs Counsel who is out in the hall and I will give you a critique." It would
have been very easy for Judge Stott to invite Plaintiffs Counsel, who was only a few feet
away out in the hall waiting for a jury verdict to return, to the pat-your-favorite-party-onthe-back meeting with Defense Counsel. However, it would have been a very
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uncomfortable meeting for Plaintiffs Counsel as Judge Stott sang praises to Defense
Counsel. Everyone, including Defense Counsel, would probably have been embarrassed
by the Court's one sidedness.
But when all is said and done, Plaintiff believes the Court's behavior not only was
inappropriate, but was a manifestation of prejudice against the Plaintiff which prevented
Plaintiff from having a fair trial and the Court should have, on its own motion, entered its
own disqualification when Plaintiff pointed out the ex parte meeting and requested that
the Court do so.
Conclusion
Due to the trial court's numerous errors in ensuring a fair trial for Plaintiff, and
because of the numerous irregularities of the trial, Plaintiff requests that the case be
remanded for a new trial with instructions that Dr. Smith not be allowed to testify, or if
he does, that Plaintiff be allowed to examine him regarding his employment by Colorado
Casualty Insurance, and that the case be tried by a new trial judge (Plaintiff is informed
that Judge Stott has retired so this issue may now be moot). Finally, that the jury be
asked specific voir dire questions and be instructed specifically regarding prejudice based
on religious belief and use of alcohol.
Request for Oral Argument
Appellant requests oral arguments on this matter.
Dated this

(

day of July 2009.
Respe/ijftuly submitted

,

Denton M. Hatch, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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THE COURT:

I don't know how she got the

information.
MR. HATCH:

She got the information by taking it

from files in her office and when--under HIPAA law, my
understanding is, she is not entitled to take that information
and use it in another case without permission.

I'm saying

that was in violation of the law.
THE COURT:

I--I don't know if that's a fact or not.

I don't have--I don't have any information in front of me from
which I can reach that conclusion.

All I know is that

whatever information is on the pad is on the pad.

So, that

exhibit will not go to the jury and rather than make any more
of an issue with it with the jury than ha^ already been made,
I'm instructing both counsel to make no reference to that
exhibit in--in closing argument.
MS. SHAPIRO:
THE COURT:
Okay.

Thank you, your Honor.
It'll — it'll die on its own.

Anything else from either of you?

MS. SHAPIRO:
MR. HATCH:

No, your Honor.

Just for the record, I think the jury

should know that it was improperly presented to them-THE COURT:

No.

MR. HATCH:

--and that's why it's withdrawn.

I

think--I think they should understand that and I think the
2 5 I information, if they consider the information on that exhibit,
21

they're considering information obtained illegally, I think
it's wrong.

I think it puts the Court in a hard position

because we can't research it, we haven't had time, the Court
doesn't know, not informed on the law, but the Court's going
to go ahead and let them decide partially on information in
that exhibit, I don't think she made that great of a point,
because pain is treated similarly, no matter where it is in
the body.

But-THE COURT:

If she didn't make that great of a

point, then you don't need to worry about it.
MR. HATCH:

--but I think--I think it's improper to

let the jury consider information that's illegally obtained.
That's all I can say.
THE COURT:

I understand.

And I'm just say--I'11--

I'll say it again, I don't like to repeat myself, but for the
purpose of responding, I don't know how it was obtained, I
don't know the circumstances under which she--she got it and
whether--whether it was available, whether there was
violations of any rules or regulations, I have no idea, but
the exhibit, as it exists, will be put in my clerk's room and
won't be any place so the jury can see it now.
I'm not going to instruct the jury any further with
regard to that exhibit.

All it does is accentuate the concern

that we've all expressed here, that we've talked about in the
last few minutes and it's absolutely proper and necessary for
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a judge to instruct a jury when--when there is an improper
presentation of information to them by way of the Rules of
Evidence, or what's admissible and what's not admissible and
then we instruct so that there's no proble|m.
As I indicated on the record, the reason I'm keeping
it out is not because that information couldn't be talked
about and couldn't be used with the expert, it's that it--it
was handled in such a manner that it was inappropriate.

And I

can't call the jury's attention to that exfhibit and say now,
the way Ms. Shapiro did this isn't really kosher and so you
have to disregard it.

I'm going to comment upon her

participation and use of it.

That's what you want me to do

and I'm not going to do that.
MR. HATCH:

I'm concerned that if I can't comment on

the exhibit, that the jury will not have a rebuttal to what
they've seen on it.
THE COURT:

Sure, you--they have a rebuttal.

You

had a right to redirect your witness on it.
MR. HATCH:

Well, they won't hav£ an argument about

it because-THE COURT:

They're not--they're not--they're not

going to be given it.
MR. HATCH:

But they're--they've got it in their

minds and unless they're told to disregard it and not consider
it in the deliberations, I think we have to be allowed to
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address it in argument.
MS. SHAPIRO:

Your Honor, I would---I would have no

objection if, in closing argument, Mr. Hatch wants to address
the exhibit, if he feels necessary, although I suppose I would
get the same courtesy.
THE COURT:

You absolutely would.

MR. HATCH:

What that does, basically, is--is it

erases what we're trying to do, I think.
THE COURT:

I--

Well, you don't--you--youfre really not

telling me you ought to be able to talk about it and--and
refer to it and do what you want to do, but she's got hands
off?

You--you-MR. HATCH:

Well, what I'm saying is--

THE COURT:

--she can't talk about it.

MR. HATCH:

--if we're going to just let it silently

disappear, then we just tell the jury not to consider it, we
don't argue it and it's gone.

That--that's what I think we

should do, because it was information-THE COURT:
it.

I'll think about it.

I'll think about

The last thing a judge ought to do is make snap judgments

about things in particular and we all have to deal with
decision making immediately in this frame of work, so, what we
all try to do is do our best to avoid making mistakes and
making appropriate judgments when we have to, so, I'll think
about it.
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88

tificate of Service (of Defendant Edwin Ray Okelberry's Response To Plaintiffs
ond Set Of Discovery Requests)

04/03/2006

89

tificate of Service (of Defendant Edwin Ray Okelberry's Response To Plaintiffs
d Set Of Discovery Requests)

04/03/2006

90

:ificate of Service (of Defendant Okelberry's Response To Plaintiffs Fourth Set
)iscovery Requests)

04/03/2006

91

ificate of Service (of Defendant Okelberry's Responses To Plaintiffs Fifth's
Of Discovery Requests)

04/03/2006

92
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ertificate of Service (of Defendant Edwin Ray Okelberry's Responses To
aintiff s Sixth Set Of Interrogatories And Request For Production Of Documents)

04/03/2006

93

^rtificate of Service (Defendant Okelberry's Supplemental Responses Plaintiffs
fth Set of Discovery Requests)

04/21/2006

94

^rtificate Of Service: Defendant's Rule 26(a)(4)(A) Fact Witness Disclosures

07/28/0600

95

Pendant's Rule 26(a)(4)(A) Fact Witness Disclosures

07/28/2006

97

Bsignation of Expert (David Ingebretsen)

08/03/2006

99

Dtice of Taking Deposition of David M Ingebertsen

08/24/2006

101

Dtice of Intent to Obtain Protected Health Information

09/13/2006

104

^signation of Expert Witness

10/12/2006

106

)tice of Intent to Obtain Protected Health Information

10/16/2006

109

)tice of Taking Deposition of Ronald B France, PhD

10/16/2006

111

^rtificate of Service: Defendant's Rule 26(a)(4)(C) Document Disclosures

10/26/2006

112

jfendant's Designation of Expert Witnesses

11/01/2006

128

)tice of Taking Deposition of Stephen Nicolatus

11/02/2006

130

aintiff s Rule 26(a)(4)(C) Document Disclosures

11/02/2006

132

iswer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Reliance Upon Jury Demand )WIN RAY OKELBERRY

12/04/2006

137

rtice of Deposition of Craig Smith

12/18/2006

139

irtificate of Readiness for Trial

01/25/2007

141

)tion In Limine

03/06/2007

143

bpoena (Michael Chung PhD)

03/06/2007

145

itice Of Deposition Upon Written Questions

03/06/2007

148

itice of Change of Address

04/02/2007

150

poMax Merit Notice of Original Deposition (Craig Smith)
rtificate of Readiness for Trial

04/09/2007
04/12/2007

153

itice Of Pretrial Conference 5/30/07

04/17/2007

156

turned Mail (Ruth A Shapiro) - resent

04/30/2007

157

iute Entry Of Pretrial Conference 5/30/07

05/30/2007

158

tice Of 4-day Jury Trial 11/5/07, 11/6/07, 11/7/07, and 11/9/07

06/02/2007

161

tice of Taking Deposition of Jessica Kearl and Colton Kearl

06/06/2007

163

fendant's Trial Witnesses

06/25/2007

165

signation of Trial Witnesses

07/10/2007

168

tice of Intent to Obtain Protected Health Information
fendant Okelberry's Motion in Limine #1 - Exclusion of Colton and Joshua
art's Testimony - EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY

09/10/2007

170

09/10/2007

172

'morandum in Support of Defendant Okelberry's Motion in Limine #1 elusion of Colton and Joshua KearPs Testimony
fendant Okelberry's Motion in Limine #2 - Exclusion of Felony Charge WIN RAY OKELBERRY

09/10/2007

205

09/10/2007

207

morandum in Support of Defendant Okelberry's Motion in Limine #2 :lusion of Felony Charge

09/10/2007

228

tion in Limine - ROBERT KEARL

09/10/2007

230
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emorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine

09/10/2007

287

Dtice of Taking Deposition of William Bacon, M.D.

09/17/2007

289

ssponse to Defendant Okelberry's Motion in Limine #1 - Exclusion of Colton
id Joshua KearPs Testimony

09/24/2007

320

ssponse to Defendant Okelberry's Motion in Limine #2 - Exclusion of Felony
large

09/24/2007

322

smorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine

09/25/2007

339

Pendant Okelberry's Reply Memorandum in Further Support of his Motion in
nine #1 - Exclusion of Colton and Joshua Kearl's Testimony

09/26/2007

347

Pendant's Request for Final Pretrial

09/26/2007

349

>quest to Submit for Decision - Defendant's Motion in Limine #2

09/26/2007

351

jquest to Submit for Decision - Defendant's Motion in Limine #1 (Oral
gument Requested)

09/26/2007

353

rtice of Intent to Obtain Protected Health Information

10/01/2007

355

iquest to Submit for Decision (Oral Argument Requested)

10/04/2007

357

aintiffs Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine

10/04/2007

364

itice Of Final Pretrial Conference 10/24/07 at 12:30pm

10/05/2007

367

bpoena (Karen Kearl)

10/09/2007

371

bpoena (Colton Kearl)

10/09/2007

375

bpoena (Jessica Kearl)

10/09/2007

379

10/09/2007

383

bpoena (Jared T Clegg MD)

10/09/2007

387

bpoena (Landa Marshall)

10/09/2007

390

fendant Edwin Ray Okelberry's Trial Exhibits

10/10/2007

393

lended Designation of Trial Witnesses
tion in Limine Allowing Evidence that Colorado Casualty Hired Craig Smith >BERT KEARL

10/11/2007

395

10/12/2007

400

tion to Send Questionnaire to Jury - ROBERT KEARL

10/12/2007

402

intiff Robert Kearl's Trial Exhibits

10/12/2007

405

fendanfs Objection to Plaintiffs Proposed Trial Exhibits

10/16/2007

412

:ice Of Final Pretrial Conference 10/24/07 at 9:00am

10/17/2007

415

jfendant's Proposed) Special Verdict
morandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Re: Colorado Casualty
jrance

10/22/2007

418

10/22/2007

430

:

endant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Questionnaire

10/22/2007

435

endant Edwin Ray Okelberry's Proposed Voir Dire Questions to the Jury

10/22/2007

441

endanfs Proposed Jury Instructions

10/22/2007

482

endant Okelberry's Trial Brief

10/22/2007

500

ntiff s Objection to Defendant's Proposed Trial Exhibits

10/22/2007

509

William Bacon MD)

ntiff's Response to Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Trial Exhibits

10/22/2007

541

ntiff's Proposed Jury Questionnaire

10/24/2007

553

ute Entry Of Final Pretrial Conference 10/24/07

10/24/2007

555

intiff s Proposed) Verdict

10/24/2007

558
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ubpoena to Appear at Trial

10/24/2007

562

otice of Filing an Amended Jury Questionnaire

10/24/2007

564

mended Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Questionnaire

10/24/2007

577

laintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions

10/24/2007

603

tipuJation of Counsel

10/29/2007

719

tipulation for Dismissal of Johnson Corporation

10/29/2007

721

efendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions

10/29/2007

727

sfendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Verdict Form

10/29/2007

731

Bfendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Amended Proposed Jury Questionnaire

10/29/2007

734

nended Subpoena to Appear at Trial

10/29/2007

737

sfendant Edwin Ray Okelberry's Supplemental Trial Exhibit

10/29/2007

739

Pendant's Request for Jury Inspection of the Subject Trailer

11/01/2007

741

5fendant's Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 34 Request for Inspection of Plaintiffs
chibit 29

11/01/2007

743

ithdrawal of Plaintiffs Objection to Defense Exhibit 58, the Cequent Trailer
oducts Instructions and Notice of Supplemental Exhibit 29

11/01/2007

745

jbpoena to Appear at Trial

11/02/2007

749

spoMax Merit Notice of Original Deposition - Dr. William Bacon

11/05/2007

750

>remptory List

11/05/2007

752

eliminary Jury Instructions

11/05/2007

763

mute Entry for Day 1 of 4-day Jury Trial

11/05/2007

765

nute Entry for Day 2 of 4-day Jury Trial

11/06/2007

767

nute Entry for Day 3 of 4-day Jury Trial

11/07/2007

769

jpplemental Jury Instructions

11/09/2007

784

jestion from Jury

11/09/2007
11/09/2007

785

)ecial Verdict
nute Entry for Day 4 of 4-day Jury Trial

11/09/2007

791

:hibit List

11/09/2007

794

jrified Memorandum of Costs

11/30/2007

798

jtry of Judgment (No Cause of Action)

12/03/2007

801

Dtion for New Trial and for Costs and Other Sanctions and Request for Hearing DBERT KEARL

12/10/2007

803

fidavit of Denton M Hatch

12/10/2007

806

fidavit of Karen Green

12/10/2007

809

fidavit of Kay Armstrong

12/10/2007

813

smorandum In Support of Motion for New Trial and for Sanctions and Request
• Hearing

12/10/2007

820

)tice to Submit for Decision

12/13/2007

822

jquest for Copy of Video/Audio Record (picked up 12/14/07)

12/14/2007

823

)tice Of Oral Arguments 2/20/08

12/28/2007

826

jfendant's Motion to Strike,Affidavit of Kay Armstrong and Denton M Hatch )WIN RAY OKELBERRY '

12/31/2007

828
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emorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits of Kay
rmstrong and Denton M Hatch

12/31/2007

837

efendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and for
anctions

12/31/2007

855

^quest for Copy of Video/Audio Record - Completed

01/02/2008

856

ULING

01/07/2008

858

aintiffs Reply in Support of Motion for a New Trial

01/09/2008

865

^sponse in Opposition to Motion to Strike Affidavits

01/15/2008

872

emorandum in Opposition to Memorandum of Costs

02/20/2008

877

inute Entry for Oral Arguments

02/20/2008

879

otion that the Court Enter a Disqualification - ROBERT KEARL

02/22/2008

881

emorandum in Support of Motion to Enter a Disqualification

02/22/2008

888

Dtion that the Court Enter a Disqualification - ROBERT KEARL

02/22/2008

890

smorandum in Support of Motion to Enter a Disqualification

02/22/2008

897

Dtion to Stay Upon Appeal - ROBERT KEARL

02/28/2008

899

sply Memorandum in Further Support of Verified Memorandum of Costs

02/28/2008

909

)tice to Submit for Decision

02/28/2008

911

rfendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion that the Court Enter
Disqualification

03/03/2008

919

fidavit of Ruth A Shapiro .;

03/03/2008

924

ithdrawal of Motion to Enter Disqualification

03/03/2008

928

der Denying Motion for New Trial

03/12/2008

932

der Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and for Sanctions

03/12/2008

935

rfendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Stay upon Appeal

03/19/2008

938

itice of Appeal

03/28/2008

940

ipy of Letter from Supreme Court of Appeals dated 4-10-08 to Mr Hatch-Case
signed to Supreme Court of Appeals (20080301)

04/14/2008

942

iquest for Copy of Video/Audio Record - Not completed as the hearing was not
:orded.

04/15/2008

943

>py of Letter from Court of Appeals dated 4-28-08 to Mr. Hatch- Case assigned
Court of Appeals (20080301)

04/29/2008

944

poMaxMerit Notice

05/01/2008

945

quest for Copy of Video/Audio Record - Completed

08/15/2008

946

ah Court Of Appeals Letter - record was borrowed and is now being returned
til briefing is completed

02/05/2009

947

ginal partial transcript of jury trial 11-5-07; transcribed by Renee Stacy

08/06/2008

948

ginal transcript of oral arguments 2-20-08; transcribed by Renee Stacy

08/06/2008

949

•ge Manilla Envelope with Jury Trial Exhibits 11/5/07 to 11/9/07

y21,2009
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KEARL
Plaintiff

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

vs .

Case No: 050401593 PI

EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY
Defendant

Appellate No: ' ^ f c & D 3 0 \

200? s<iAV 2

•-T rnur

=3 & 2

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAY 2 6 2009

STATE OF UTAH )
SS.

COUNTY OF UTAH
I, KRISTEN ROGERS, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of
the 4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
foregoing and hereunto attached papers and file constitute all of the
original papers filed in the above-entitled Court and cause, including the
Notice of Appeal and Minute Entries, and which attached papers constitute
the Judgment Roll and other papers filed in the above action.
I further certify that the Judgment Roll and papers contained in
said file or by me this day transmitted to the Appellate Court,
of the State of Utah, pursuant to said Appeal.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL of said District Court at my office in
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO, STATE OF UTAH, this 2j^day of / U A ^
, 200J.

^HS^

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE JN THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL CHSTRUCTQQt^toAM

COUNTY, STAT5 OF UTAK^SS?H?K4fc

Tab 3

HLED !N
4TH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

2001 D E C 1 T P % 5!

DENTON M. HATCH, #1413
Attorney for Plaintiff
128 West 900 North, Suite C
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
Phone (801) 794-3852
Fax (801) 794-3859
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KEARL,
AFFIDAVIT OF
KAY ARMSTRONG

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 050401593
Jud^eGaryD. Stott
Division 4

EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY,
Defendant.

11

i

•'

Kay Armstrong, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I was the juror foreman in the captioned case.

2.

I was present in the jury room during the deliberations of the jury.

3.

One of the problems I saw was prejudice on the part of more than one juror.

4.

Mr. W. Gary Harward came into the jury room and suggested we offer prayer,

which he wanted to offer and he did so. He came in the jury room with his mind made up. After
the prayer and after a short jury discussion, he folded his arms across his chest, he said Defendant
Okelberry was not liable, and Mr. Harward would not budge.

1

813

5.

The reason he said he would not consider changing his opinion was because he

thought that the Plaintiff Robert Kearl was doing some things in his life that Mr. Harward
thought were wrong. Specifically, Mr. Harward could not get past the fact that Plaintiff drank
alcohol and did not hold to Mr. Harward's religious standards, which he cited several times to me
and once or twice to the jury, even though these facts had no relation to the injury and how it
occurred.
6.

In comparison, Defendant Ray Okelberry's daughter testified at trial that

Defendant Okelberry did not drink or smoke.
7.

I told Mr. Harward that I thought the problem was that Mr. Harward was

comparing what Mr. Kearl was doing in his life with what Mr. Harward thought Mr. Kearl should
be doing morally. Mr. Harward kept saying that Mr. Kearl did not do what he was supposed to
do, and he was in effect getting what he deserved. Mr. Harward started with this statement and
ended with this statement.
8.

In essence, Mr. Harward was judging Mr. Kearl by his own religious standards and

not with the evidence presented at trial.
9.

I don't think anything else made a difference to Mr. Harward. He did not at any

time want to discuss with an open mind evidence presented in Court about how the injury
happened [emphasis added].

2

5i^

DATED this LS

day of December 2007.

State of Utah

)
§
County of Utah )
Kay Armstrong, upon being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she has read the
foregoing document and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true to the best of her
knowledge and belief.
Dated this 5

day of December 2007.

fflvnit

Notary Public/D<eputy Clerk

3
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FILED
MAR 1 3 2008

Karra J. Porter, 5223
Ruth A. Shapiro, 9356
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Okelberry
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)323-5000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KEARL,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DEYING PLANTIFF'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND FOR
SJANCTIONS

VQ

EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY,
Defendant.

Civil No. 050401593
Judge Gary D. Stott
Division 4

Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial and for Sanctions came on for hearing before the
Honorable Gary D. Stott, District Court Judge, on Wednesday, February 20, 2008 at 11:00 a.m.
Plaintiff was represented by Denton Hatch. Defendant was represented by Kara J. Porter and Ruth
A. Shapiro of Christensen & Jensen, P.C. The Court, having studied the submissions of counsel,
having heard oral argument, and otherwise being fully advised in tfye premises, now enters the
following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, AS FOLLOWS:
Based upon the Court's own familiarity of the voir dire process in this case and questioning

of prospective jurors, and based upon the totality of evidence adduced by both parties at trial and the
evidence adduced by Plaintiff in his post trial motion, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff has
met his burden of demonstrating that a new trial is necessary or appropriate in this case. The Court
is not persuaded the Plaintiff has proved the elements necessary for a new trial based upon alleged
jury misconduct during the voir dire process.
Further, the Court is not persuaded that any alleged attorney misconduct with respect to
withdrawn Exhibit 38, which was addressed at the time of trial, is sufficient grounds for a new trial.
Based upon the Court's own observations at trial, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff has
had his day in court and received a fair trial. The jury deliberated for a long time and returned a
verdict allowed by law.
Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial is hereby denied, each party to bear its own costs and fees
associated with the Motion.
DATED this /<£- day of March, 2008.

Approved as to Form:

Denton M. Hatch
Attorney for Plaintiff

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the

day of March, 2008, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing ORDER DEYING PLANTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND FOR
SANCTIONS was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to:
Denton M. Hatch
128 West 900 North, Suite C
Spanish Fork UT 84660
Attorney for Plaintiff

3

FILED
MAR 1 % 2008
4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

DENTON M. HATCH, #1413
Attorney for Plaintiff
128 West 900 North, Suite C
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
Phone (801) 794-3852
Fax (801) 794-3859
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KEARL,
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 050401593
Judge Gary D. Stott
Division 4

EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY,
Defendant.

A hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial was held on February 20, 2008. Denton
Hatch appeared for the Plaintiff and Kara Porter appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The court
heard the arguments of counsel and reviewed all of the memoranda relating to this motion, and
being fully advised hereby enters the following order:
1.

With respect to juror failure to disclose strong feelings and opinions, if it had

come to the Court's attention that a juror had strong feelings and opinions regarding religious
beliefs which would cause the juror to vote against a person based on these feelings and opinions
rather than the evidence, that juror would have been dismissed. However, the Court had no
indication or evidence in the written response of the juror or in the Court's interview with that
1

juror that raised a red flag or even a yellow flag that there was prejudice. The Court had an indepth discussion with the juror and counsel had an opportunity to ask questions and he remained
on the panel. Assuming the juror did as stated in the Affidavit of Kay Armstrong, and that he
requested prayer and then sat with his arms folded saying that Plaintiff should have no recovery
and did not participate with other jurors, the Court cannot ignore that the jury came back saying
no liability. Six said no liability and two said there was liability. The other jurors were not
affected, they went ahead and honestly evaluated liability. The Court is not persuaded by the
argument that in hindsight something should have been different. Therefore, juror impropriety is
not a basis for a new trial.
2.

With respect to the issue of counsel misconduct and hiding or evidence, the Court

took painstaking care that nothing was said to the jury regarding the exhibit. The exhibit was
stricken, and the attorneys were not allowed to say anything about the exhibit to the jury.
Further, the exhibit did not address the issue of liability. There is no evidence that the few
minutes when that exhibit was presented affected the determination of liability. Jurors were told
that their responsibility was to find liability before discussing damages. If there is no liability,
then damages is not an issue. The jury found the defendant not negligent, therefore the jury was
not allowed to discuss damages. The jury was out for a long time, abput five hours, and six found
no negligence. Therefore, Mr. Kearl had a full and impartial trial.
THEREFORE Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial is denied.

2

DATED this

| ft- day of

"fj^A^cJ^

Approved as to Form

3
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jury room.

Counsel indicated they had a--something they

wanted to discuss outside the presence of the jury; is that
right, folks?
MR. HATCH:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Go ahead, sir.

MR. HATCH:

First off, I don't like being deceived

and I was deceived on Wednesday by Mr. Kearl in Court.

She

introduced an exhibit and--which I had ftever seen, I objected
to on the basis that I'd never seen, when she questioned Dr.
France.

She showed me part of it and then as she walked back,

she said, oh, by the way, there's something under this paper.
I didn't know what it was until she disclosed it, but it was
confidential medical information and should never have been
disclosed.
I didn't have an opportunity to raise that issue and
I thought the way she did it was sneaky.

I think the reason

she did it is because she was hoping there wouldn't be an
objection and if you said to her, Ms. Shapiro, don't do that,
it would be worth it, she thought the point was worth it, I
think; but I--I, since then, have talked to Dr. France on the
medical plans, in big letters on the front are the words "This
shall not be disclosed without permission of the patient."
And it just so happens that one of those medical
plans she summarized and published was one of Karen Green, a
client of mine in another case, and I contacted Karen and
12

1

asked her if she had given permission, she said , I 'd never do

2

that.

3

behalf of someone I, you know, didn't know.

4

I JEeel expose d enough, I'd never--never do that on

She reques bed that I notify the Court of that and

5

there was no way I could know beforehand or check into it.

6

Now, if Ruth had filed a motion and, you know, like the Court

7

has asked, we could have resolved any issues, found out about

8

if it was a proper disclosure.

9

I--I just think the way it was done was sneaky in

10

light of the fact that the Court has asked for full disclosure

11

in advance.

12

names were not disclosed, it's not a violation of privacy, but

13

her--her partner handles the case, the Green case that I have

14

so what she did probably is, she went to those medical

15

records, went through those medical records and then

16

summarized them and used them in this case.

17

violation, my understanding, it's a violation of what HIPAA--

18

what HIPAA allows.

19

She--I think she will argue that because the

I think that's a

We all know that HIPAA law has got layers and layers

20

of protection now, for--for medical records and I think, even

21

though the--the records were turned over to the firm and--when

22

they were subpoenaed, still, that doesn't mean that there is

23

an open right to disclose them.

24

to--I'm moving the Court for an order withdrawing that

25

exhibit, telling the jury to ignore what they heard about that

So, I'm--I'm asking the Court

13

1

exhibit and that it shouldn't have been presented to them.

2

THE COURT:

M s . Shapiro?

3

M S . SHAPIRO:

4

First of all, I'm not inclined to have a

Thank you, your Honor.

5

professional attack on Mr. Hatch.

6

progress of this case, what's been disclosed and what hasn't

7

been disclosed.

8
9

The Court knows the

This exhibit, as the Court pointed out when I
offered it, is a rebuttal exhibit.

10

for Mr. Kearl.

11

protect the patients.

It has no names, except

We specifically used initials in order to
We did not review medical records.

12

Mr. Hatch retained a professional expert and as is

13

course, the normal course for any competent attorney, when I

14

get the case list from Dr. France or from Mr. Ingebritsen or

15

from Mr. Nicolatus or Dr. Clegg or the other--the other

16

experts they retained, I go through that list and I contact

17

people I know who have retained the same expert to see if I

18

can find impeachment material.

19

And that's what I did.

We got reports which indicate that Dr. France makes

20

the same recommendations, regardless of gender, age,

21

employment or injury.

22

out of our way to protect their privacy by not disclosing

23

their names.

24

know, as I understand with Ms. Green, perhaps hundreds of

25

p a g e s , I don't work on the Green case.

That's impeachment material.

We went

This is a chart, it does not delineate, you

dne of m y

colleagues

happens to be involved with it.
be involved with.

Dr. France's name came up, we made a chart

for impeachment purposes.
material.

The other case, I happened to

That's proper use of impeachment

Nobody's HIPAA--we didn't violate any HIPAA

violation--or I'm sorry, we didn't violate any HIPAA
regulations, we didn't disclose any patient names.

It--it--I

honestly wasn't planning to use it as an exhibit as far as
offering it, but just mainly for demonstrative purposes.
And at this point, our position is that certainly,
Mr.--it's a little of the pot calling the kettle black, for
sure, but Mr. Hatch was not deceived by any manner or means.
He had the same access to information, in fact, more, because
one of the people is his own client.

This strictly was used

for rebuttal and impeachment purposes and--and it's our
position that it's properly used for those purposes.
Thank you, your Honor.
MR. HATCH:

I think there's an appropriate procedure

so that we're all not put in this position at the last minute
after having inadvertently done something that, I think,
violates the law.

And that procedure is to file a motion and

to see if it can be presented.

She knows it's confidential,

it's in italics on the front page.

And I'll fight tooth and

nail before I'll let anybody lump what I've done in with what
she's done.

It was just plain sneaky.

She objected to me giving her Steve Nicolatus' re-15

exhibit, I didn't give it to her, she said, in time
hours late .

I was 24

That exhi --we all know that economists have to

change their exhibits because present value changes in a year.
And she had notified us that our medical expenses were too
high and so we reduced the medical expenses and he also
reduced a couple of other numbers.

Small changes.

had that exhibit and the format for a year.

She had

The worst you can

say I did was give it to her 24 hours late, but she had it way
in advance and it's an exhibit that she had--she had talked to
him about in his deposition a year ago.
sneaky about that, I promise to you.

There was nothing

A^d I'll fight tooth and

nail before I'll let the Court, without an objection, say,
this is a two-way street.
THE COURT:

This is a one-way street.

I think it's fair to say that there have

been, on both sides, untimely disclosure and exchanges of
information in this case.

I commented on the record before we

left the last time, particularly to Mr. Hatch, as to this doc-what's the exhibit number?
MR. HATCH:

38.

THE COURT:

As to this Exhibit) 38, thank you.

I have to acknowledge that I was taken back and I
use the word "stunned" when I saw how it was used.
the reason.

And here's

When it was shown to me, it was shown to me with

the top portion exposed and nothing else on the bottom had
anything that the jurors were looking at, or that I saw.

It
16

1

was merely represented to be a recital of his information and

2

rebuttal exhibit.

3

going to be able to have by way of a blow-up size so that it

4

could be talked with with the jury, as she cross-examined the

5

doctor.

6

I assumed it was something that she was

I was taken back when she started to peel layer

7

after layer off, of information with respect to other persons

8

that he has seen.

9

was inappropriate.

10

In the posture in which it was done, that
It was deceptive in nature.

An exhibit is supposed to be disclosed, particularly

11

to a judge who has to make a ruling on whether it should come

12

in or not, and you don't hide part of an exhibit and then,

13

after the exhibit's been received, at the request of counsel,

14

then start peeling layers off to expose something that none of

15

us expected.

16

That's why I say I was stunned.

That was wrong.

As to the information that was discussed, that

17

information is appropriate.

Expert witnesses can be

18

confronted about their prior participation, about the--about

19

the testimony and recommendations they made in the case that's

20

before the Court and how it's exactly the same as it's been in

21

other situations with other people; fortunately, one of the--

22

one of the things I was really nervous about, real nervous,

23

since I couldn't see what it was, it was on the easel in front

24

of the jury and its back was to me, was whether it had any

25

names on it of not.

There was no--there was no way for Mr.
17

1

Hatch to know what was on it, I had absolutely no idea what

2

was going to happen with it until it happened.

3

Fortunately, it didn't have names on it, so it

4

didn't show persons, it didn't show identification information

5

in any fashion.

I looked at that--

6

MR. HATCH:

It did show initials.

7

THE COURT:

I--

MR. HATCH:

And it did show the plan.

THE COURT:

It did show the plan and that's the kind

of information that counsel opposing an expert witness like
this is entitled to talk about, but I--you can take an expert
witness and you can go down deposition after deposition that
he's given, you can use trial transcripts with an expert
witness and say, isn't it a fact that in the trial of suchand-such, you testified this way with respect to a plan for
care?

And you can go right down the line.

You can, where

information has been received, ask expert witnesses--or ask
questions of expert witnesses to show that the expert witness
in the case in chief, testifies the same way every single
time.

I've seen it, I've done it, I've seen other lawyers do

it, both before I hit this posture of the courtroom and when I
was sitting in your chairs.

It's acceptable, but it wasn't

acceptable in the way in which it was done in this case.
And the reason it wasn't was because of just what I
25 I explained, because the full exhibit was hidden from me, the
18

1

full exhibit was hidden from Mr. Hatch.

2

only hopeful that what was underneath it as it started to peel

3

off wasn't something the jury shouldn't see.

4
5

I, as I said, I was

The exhibit won't go to the jury.

I didn't know.
The information

will remain.

6

MS. SHAPIRO:

Your Honor, can you, just by--just for

7

record purposes, as I recall, and I think the record will

8

reflect, and I apologize if there was a miscommunication

9

regarding the interpretation of the exhibit, that was not our

10

purpose.

11

pages underneath that were covering up the two lower portions

12

and I'd indicated to you that there was more information

13

below, so it was--

14
15
16

When I presented the exhibit to you, it did have two

THE COURT:

No.

I respectfully--I respectfully

disagree with that representation.
Now, that's been a few days ago, you may be right,

17

but my recollection was that this is used--this exhibit is

18

being used for rebuttal purposes and there was never a

19

reference of any nature, of any kind, going to a bottom

20

portion of information on that document.

21

I am--I am really a stickler when I deal with

22

exhibits, because I don't want to have something go to a jury

23

that they shouldn't see and I find myself--I know I shouldn't

24

do this, but I do, it's my toilet training, I guess, of 28

25

years of practicing law and that is that I find myself asking,
19

when--when one lawyer will offer an exhibit and the other
lawyer simply says, no objection, I ask myself almost every
single time, are you sure you have no objection?

Do you

really know what this exhibit says, without taking a look at
it?

Because too many times, things get put in intentionally

or inadvertently, that should never be there.
So,

I'm--I'm fairly confident that there was no

discussion with respect to additional information on it.

If

there had been, that would have been something of note, I
would have looked and we would have had a discussion off the
record--or excuse me, discussion with the jury out of the room
and on the record before we did anything ih terms of admitting
that exhibit.
MS. SHAPIRO:

Well, I guess we have a constructive

disagreement, but there--the record speaks for itself.

So,

thank you, your Honor.
MR. HATCH:

May I try to clarify myself just a

little on one point?
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. HATCH:

I agree with the Court that an expert

can be questioned in that manner, that's--that's not what I
was trying to address.

What I was trying to address and I

didn't say it, so that's my fault, but what I was trying to
address is, the manner in which she got that information
violated HIPAA, violated the law.
20

Tab 6

instruction would explain that, why he may have reacted
differently than they would, including drinking, I think it
exacerbated that pre-existing condition.

I--I use the word

"condition" is an expansive way.
The same with 24, a person susceptible to injury.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I have those originals and they

need to go back in the file.
Cheryl, I'll put them right here with the file.
Thank you.
All right.

Thank you very mi^ch, Counsel.

Ready to

have me bring the jury in?
MS. SHAPIRO:

Yes, sir.

MR. HATCH:

Pardon?

THE COURT:

Are you ready to have me bring the jury

in, subject to dealing with Exhibit No. 38?
MR. HATCH:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay.

This is what I have concluded, as

I indicated to you I would think about it, see where I was
going to go with it.

I'm going to instruct the jury to

disregard Exhibit 38, that it is no longer part of the
exhibits that they will be considering and they should not be
concerned with respect to the reasons why it is no longer part
of the exhibit.
The information contained on Exhibit A, for the
purpose of their deliberations may be--may be disregarded.
28

You 're still both entitled to argue Dr . France s
conclusions as that sheet pertains to Mr . Kearl, but not as to
the other- two phantom persons.
MS. SHAPIRO:
THE COURT:

Okay?

Sure.

Thank you

Okay.

You can bring them

in, will you please, Taylor?
THE CLERK:

Sure.

THE BAILIFF:
THE COURT:

All rise.

Okay.

You may be seated.

Thank you

very much.
Okay.

We're back on the record, the jurors have

returned to the courtroom, counsel are present with their
clients.
Ladies and gentlemen, subject to those materials
going down the line to you--we're okay--there are two sets of
jury instructions, the initial ones that I gave you to begin
with, all of you should have those in your hands, the
supplemental instructions have been passed out.

Before I

begin to read them, there is one bit of information I need to
make--to give to you and make a record of.
I'm to advise you that Exhibit No. 38, which is the
large blow-up exhibit of comparisons that was used during Dr.
France's testimony, is no longer an exhibit in the case.
Since it's no longer an exhibit in the case, you are to
disregard any of the information from it except as to what Dr.
29

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

France has testified to concerning Mr. Kearl only.
All right.

Now, we will go to the preliminary

instructions that I gave you, we're on Page 7, Instruction 15.
Keri, go make another copy, I didn't realize she
didn't have one.
I don't want to have Ms. Thomas looking off of
somebody's, so the bailiff is making a copy quickly.

8

Until he returns, I'll start, to save us some time.

9

Instruction 15 on the preliminary instructions.

10

have provided you with some additional pages which contain

11

instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that

12

apply in this case.

13

with the same number as this instruction, followed by a

14

sequential letter of the alphabet.

15

instructions now before completing our reading of the

16

remaining supplemental instructions.

17
18
19

I

Each additional instruction is designated

We will read those

And I need to get them back from the bailiff and
then we'll start.
For purpose of our discussion here with respect to

20

instructions, let me give you a little bit of background

21

information, why it's done in this fashion.

22

Thank you, Taylor.

23

We have in the law, general instructions and

24

specific instructions.

General instructions deal with the

25

general operation of the case itself.

Specific instructions,
30
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PROCEEDINGS

EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY,

called as a witness, having been duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:

1

Q.

Have you had any employment relationship with him?

2

A.

Yeah. When he first got married he worked for me

3

a day — a day or two up there at Silver Divide building a

4

fence. And then as he got a truck — he drove truck for us

5

occasionally. I don't know how many times a year. Not very

8

many times a year. Some years. Not every year. And then

7

he got his own truck and he hauled a few loads of sheep for

8

us there.

9
EXAMINATION

10

BY MR. HATCH:

PAGE
.... 3

Q.

So he was a part-time employee?

A.

I don't know that I'd call it part-time. At first

11

when he first got married he worked for me. And then after

12

that we had a little trouble and that was the end of that.

Q.

WW you state your name and address, please.

13

Q.

So about how long did he work for you?

A.

My name is Edwin Ray Okelberry, Goshen, Utah, Box

14

A.

Well, he worked — he might have worked, you

415, 55 East Main.
MS. SHAPIRO: Make sure you speak nice and slowly
for the court reporter. She'll let you know if you're going

15

know — I don't know how much. Not very much. I don't

16

think he worked four or five days a year for us or five or

17

six or something like that.

too fast.

18

Q.

How many years?

BY MR. HATCH:

19

A.

I can't really tell you. He never was a full-time

Q.

What is your relationship with Robert Kearl?

20

employee. He never was an employee. He would go with us on

A.

He married my daughter Karen.

21

occasions.

Q.

How long have you known him?

22

Q.

He had other employment?

A.

I've known him since they got married.

23

A.

Yes, he had other employment. I t seemed like he

Q.

Do you know how long that is?

24

was doing pretty good. And he was willing to come around

A.

No. Probably 18, 19 years.

25

and help.

3

-22

1

Bob there.

u.

wnat caused -- go ahead.

2

A.

That's ail I had to say.

2

3

Q.

What caused the split?

3

employed I had him up there building a fence with another

4

A.

What caused what kind of a split?

4

bunch of people. They all went over to Eureka and got drunk

5

Q.

You said there was some kind of trouble.

5

and I was very upset about that. That was the first

6

A.

Well, Bob is pretty independent and a pretty

6

experience I had with Bob and did not like it. And, you

7

independent thinker. And he had his way of doing things and

7

know, what do you do about that.

8

I had my way of doing things. And I was the boss or I was

8

financially responsible for Okelberry Ranch or Ray

9

9
10

Okelberry's endeavors.

11

And I couldn't get along with Bob. You know, I'd

THE WITNESS: No. The first time I had him

They was building a fence up there. He helped
Arlyn or something. Sometimes he was a helper with him up

10

there on that fence. They chewed up a saddle and just

11

mismanagement of things. That's all I remember about that.

12

tell him to do something and he always had a different idea.

12

13

Not always maybe. But on equipment I'd tell him to be

13

road and I don't know. Bob we worked him there and we had

14

careful and he seemed to think he knew more about the

14

him there making those loads of hauling those sheep. And he

15

equipment than I did, but yet I was paying the bills.

15

hauled some cattle.

! 16

And, you know, we have to leave pretty early in

him that I didn't want him around. There was just too much

17

the morning. And so we'd try to get there. And we'd get

16
17

We got over that all right and went on down the

And it finally got to the point that I had to tell

8

confusion. He'd come up there and jump onto me. And it

18

there and we'd wonder where Bob was. And he'd be the last

9

wasn't good for my health. I t wasn't good for the ranch.

19

one to show up. But yet when we got out there at 200 miles

0

I t wasn't good for getting anything done. I t wasn't good

20

and headed home he'd be the first one home. And that didn't

1

for the equipment. I t wasn't any good for him. And then he

21

set too well with us, you know. He should have been there

2

had a family growing up and it wasn't any good for them.

J

Q.

Do you remember about when that was?

I 22
23

to start with with the rest. He should have come in with
the rest.

\

MS. SHAPIRO: When the trouble started?

24

Q.

I see.

i

MR. HATCH: When he decided that he didn't want

25

A.

That's the way you run a trucking outfit.
8

5
Q.

So you decided the relationship wasn't good and

1

A.

I should say I was afraid of him.

2

0.

Physically?

That didn't cause any problem at all. That was

3

A.

Yes.

just a sore spot. But then when he would get on a piece

4

Q.

Did he harm you physically?

equipment and abuse it I didn't like that at all.

5

A.

Well, I don't know. Pounding on your chest I

decided to -A.

MS. SHAPIRO: Ray, I want you to listen to his
question and just answer the question, okay.
THE WITNESS: All right.
BY MR. HATCH:
Q.

So when did you decide the relationship was bad

enough that you shouldn't work together?
A.

I don't know. One time I was taking a shower and

6

don't know how much physical harm it did. He neyer did

7

knock me down. He never did hit me. He thumped me on the

8

chest.

9

Q.

You felt threatened?

A.

I certainly did feel threatened and I still tried

10
11

to be polite and get along. But it wasn't — I was scared

12

of him.

he came into the shower and thumped me on the chest. And I

13

don't know what his problem was then, but it wasn't very

14

nice for me. Some old man in the shower taking a shower and

15

here's some big husky guy coming down there. I didn't like

16

that at all. I didn't want that again. I didn't want to be

17

Q.

Okay. Do you have an estimation of when you

decided to split ways with him?
A.

No. I t was after he built his house and he

borrowed our equipment down there.
And that was fine. But they abused the equipment

18

and I got the equipment back and I had bills on it. And

19

that was still all right. But it was after that point

was before the — I had another incident. He came down and

20

that - I just couldn't take the emotional strain. And I

he knocks on the door I guess. And I was there and my wife

21

had the kids, you know, they didn't like grandpa and I was a

and the two daughters was there. And still the same thing,

22

bad guy and I was this.

fou know, I was a bad guy. I don't know what it was all

23

MS. SHAPIRO: Ray, do you remember the time frame?

ibout. I can't remember that. But anyway —

24

THE WITNESS: I don't. I t was after he built the

around him after that.
I don't know if that was the first — I think that

Q.

So were you afraid of him?

25
7

house. I don't know how long he's had the house. It's been

n

1

way we did th>. ^s or he didn't like me or he didn't like

MS. SHAPIRO: Okay. That's fine.

2

something. I was getting older and I didn't need that. I

THE WITNESS: Twelve years ago. If he's been

3

didn't need it.

over ten years ago.

married 18 years it's been half of that time.

4

BY MR. HATCH:

5

Q.

So maybe you worked together for nine or so?

6

A.

I can't say we ever worked together. I never

7
8

really worked together. He helped us on occasions and that

Q.

Yeah. Why did the grandkids call you a bad guy?

A.

Well, I don't know that they ever did call me a

bad guy. But they, you know —
MS. SHAPIRO: I'm going to object to the relevance
of this. You can go ahead and answer.

9

was it.
Q.

And that would have been for about nine years?

10

A.

Yeah, probably so.

11

Q.

Okay. So how would you describe your relationship

12

with Robert since you split ways?
MS. SHAPIRO: What time frame? Now or at the time

THE WITNESS: You want me to do what?
MS. iHAPIRO: You can go ahead and answer the
question.
THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know that they thought

13

I was a bad guy. But, you know, you've got your dad at odds

14

with the dad-in-law or the grandpa. How would the kids ~

of this incident?

15

it was always turmoil. The kids didn't dare come around.

BY MR. HATCH:

16

And I tried to accommodate the kids. You know, I still do.

Q.

We just talked about the first nine years that he

knew him. Now let's talk about the second nine years that
you've known him.
A.

I t seemed like he got steadily a little worse. I

don't know. More threatening.
Q.

So your relationship has gone downhill it sounds

like?
A.

It's gone downhill ever since he came on board. I

gave him an opportunity and, you know, he didn't like the

17

MR. HATCH: Excuse me, let's take a quick break.

18

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

19

THE WITNESS: The grandkids still came around.

20

They came around. I got along with the grandkids. I tried

21

to get along with the grandkids.

22

BY MR. HATCH:

23

Q.

Did you ever hit any of them?

24

A.

No, I never did.

25

MS. SHAPIRO: I'm going to object to the form,

9
relevance.
THE WITNESS: I never hit one of them kids ever.
BY MR. HATCH:
Q.
A.

You ever hit one of them with a BB gun?

10
1

eagle on my property and I went and picked it up and took it

2

to the junkyard.

3

Q.

Your understanding is you were not convicted?

4

A.

No.

No.

5

Q.

Have you been charged with any other crimes?

MS. SHAPIRO: Object. Don't answer that. That is

6

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

7

Q.

Okay. Anything else you can tell us about your

not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery —
THE WITNESS: I haven't even had a BB gun in my
hand for 50 years.

8
9

MS. SHAPIRO: Ray, don't answer the question.
MR. HATCH: I think it is relevant because the

relationship with Robert at this point?
A.

No. I felt sorry for Robert. You know, if he was

10

having marital problems with my daughter I couldn't get into

11

that. And I wish the best of luck to both of them. And I

relationship between the families goes to ~ I think is

12

never really had anything against Bob. I kind of like Bob.

relevant to why their stories are different.

13

And I can understand a person can get down and out of luck.

MS. SHAPIRO: How does the involvement of the
jrandkids have anything to do with that?

14

Q.

15

MR. HATCH: Weil, the close relationship between
he father and the kids I think is part of it.
MS. SHAPIRO: He answered the question about

Let's talk about -- let's mark this.
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 1 was marked

16

for identification.)

17

BY MR. HATCH:

18

Q.

You like Bob?

sitting the grandchildren and I think that's sufficient.

19

A.

I really like Bob and I still like Bob.

>Y MR. HATCH:

20

Q.

You're pals?

Q.

Have you ever been convicted of a felony?

21

A.

I wouldn't say we're pals, but I respect Bob.

A.

I don't think so. I don't think anybody convicted

22

Q.

You have a good relationship?

le of a felony. You can check the records.

23

MS. SHAPIRO: Are you talking presently?

Q.

Were you charged with a felony?

24

MR. HATCH: Yeah.

A.

I was charged with the felony. They implanted an

25

THE WITNESS: I explained that earlier.

11

12

4 ; 3|

1

well, they're e.

.tly alike. I bought them from Joe Penn

2

Q.

I'm just wondering if you're changing it?

2

and I paid that much for them. And it says that I bought

3

A.

I'm not changing it a bit. I had some compassion

3

them 3 / 2 6 / 2 0 0 0 and 4 / 1 9 / 2 0 0 0 . They were Army traile

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

for him and I wanted the best for him and his family.
Q.

Okay. So how would you describe your relationship

now?
A.

Well, he's got a restraining order. He can't come

around the place.
Q.

Your place?

A.

Well, he's not supposed to come on my premises the

way I understand it.

Q.

Who is Joe Penney?

5

A.

I guess he's a person from down around Fillmore

6

something. He bought this — he had those trailers. That'

7

all I know. He came there one day and wanted — I had

8

bought some other surplus trailers from the Fillmore area

9

and I guess he heard about it.

10

He brought one of these good trailers in there to

11

me one day. And he asked if I was interested and I told h

12

I was. I bought one. I said if you can find another one

13

buy it and he did. And that's the two trailers right there.

12

Q.

13

premises?

14

A.

Right. It's my request that he doesn't—

14

15

Q.

You've told him if he comes on —

15

documents relating to the trailer that was involved in this

MS. SHAPIRO: You can go ahead and let him finish

16

injury?

16
17

Is it your request that he not come on your

4

his answer, please.

18

THE WITNESS: I've told him earlier not to come on

19

my premises.

!0

BY MR. HATCH:

Q.

Now, you produced this pursuant to our request for

17

A.

That's right. One of them is.

18

Q.

Can you tell us which one?

19

A.

I think it's the first one there. The first one

20

that I purchased, but I'm not positive.

1

Q.

So he's not welcome to come on your farm, right?

21

Q.

The amount 2773 on top there?

2

A.

That's right.

22

A.

The first one I purchased was 3 / 1 9 -

3

Q.

I'll show you what's been marked as Exhibit 1.

23

4

Would you identify that for us?

3/26/2000

just a month earlier. Well, it was only 24 days earlier.

24

Q.

Okay. So the bottom one you think is the one?

25

A.

Uh-huh.

5

A.

There's two trailers that are pretty well alike —

I

Q.

The one that says 3/26/2000?

1

I

A.

Yeah. They were identical when they came on my

2

I

property.

3

\

Q.

All right.

4

(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 2 was marked

5

13

>
i

14
sent to you?
A.

I should say.
MS. SHAPIRO: Do you want to see the question?

THE WITNESS: Well, the question is MS. SHAPIRO: No, here's the question,

for identification.)

6

BY MR. HATCH:

7

THE WITNESS: Let's see.

8

MS. SHAPIRO: He's talking about this part.

Q.

Can you identify Exhibit 2 for us? Have you seen

Interrogatory No. 3. He's talking about this one up here.

9

that before?
MS. SHAPIRO: You may want to show him the

10

THE WITNESS: That trailer I guess that's the
information on that trailer if it's the -- have we got a

11

photo of that, of the information we took? That will tell

MR. HATCH: Pardon me?

12

you if that's the same thing.

MS. SHAPIRO: I mean, I had a hard time figuring

13

BY MR. HATCH:

complete responses.

out what was what. It's out of context. So all I'm saying

14

is you may want to show him the complete responses.

15

Q.

Is that the trailer that you think was ~

A.

I think that's right, but I'm not sure. They're

MR. HATCH: Do you want me to get it?

16

identical. They're just identical as they can be. And I

MS. SHAPIRO: I mean, I have a copy with me. I

17

don't know what one we had under there — was under there

just think from a context standpoint it may help him out as

18

when Bob requested to put his truck under there. This is

opposed to one page.

19

the one we was working on. And the number we got a picture

20

of it today. I think this is whatever if they took it. I

MR. HATCH: We'll give you a minute to read it.
MS. SHAPIRO: AH right. Here's the whole
document. It's the third page of this document.
THE WITNESS: What do you want me to answer here?

haven't checked it so I can't agree with it. I f we could
check it against that serial number, then I would agree with

23

that.

24

BY MR. HATCH:
Q.

21
22

Is that your answer to Interrogatory No. 3 that we
15

25

MS. SHAPIRO: I can represent to you it's the
information taken off the plate on the trailer.

16

2

I

MK. MATCH: Okay.

1
2

THE WITNESS: It's a well marked trailer.

This is the trailer you showed me when I visited

held.)

5

BY MR. HATCH!:

I can't remember exactly the sequence of what we

6

went through. But we had two trailers there. And I think I

7

told you that the trailer that was under that shed that Bob

8

pulled that pin on and got hurt on we had taken it out to

(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was

4

you the second time out on your farm?
A.

minute.

3

BY MR. HATCH:
Q.

MS. SK. . IRO: Can we go off the record for a

9

Q.

So Exhibit 3 is the trailer you think was involved

in the injury?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay. And I believe you said you - what did you

the desert out where we had put some cement rings on it or

10

something to make a spring out there — to fix a spring.

11

A.

Just general ranch use.

That's where that trailer was. And then you guys — w e

12

Q.

Give us some examples.

A.

You could haul panels on it. You could have put a

purchase it for when you originally purchased it?

brought it back in so you'd have it. It's been in Goshen

13

ever since. We only used it one time since this thing

14

water tank on it. You could have hauled a pickup on it.

happened.

15

You could have hauled salt on it. You could have hauled hay

16

on it.

(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 3 was marked
for identification.)
THE WITNESS: This picture was taken last year

And do you license the trailer?

18

A.

No. For farm use you don't have to license it.

19

Q.

And not even when you take it to Nevada?

20

A.

No, it wasn't.

THE WITNESS: So that's the trailer.

21

Q.

And let's go to the time of the injury which was

BY MR, HATCH:
So you're saying Exhibit 3 is the trailer that you

think was involved?
A.

Q.

MR. HATCH: Right.

taken after we had brought it back from the desert.

Q.

17

22

around September 2001. I believe you said you were working

23

on it in your shop. Do you recall what you were doing?

24

Right. This is the trailer.

25

MS. SHAPIRO: I'm going to object to the extent it
misstates his testimony, but he can clarify that.
18

17
1

THE WITNESS: Well, we had that trailer in there.
We was trying to get it so it was road worthy and put the

2

jack on it. There wasn't any way you could manage it

3

without a jack on it.

4

BY MR. HATCH:

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And that's what you were — had you completed the

work —
A.

Yes, sir.

5

Q.

— when the injury happened?

Q.

When you bought it it did not have a jack?

6

A.

We had it welded on.

A.

No, it did not have a jack on it.

7

Q.

Okay.

Q.

So between the time you bought it in March of 2000

ind August of 2001, which is about a year and a half, it did
lot have a jack?
A.

I don't know what month we put the jack on. I

8

A.

We've never done anything to it since.

9

Q.

Are you familiar with jacks?

10

A.

Very much so.

II

Q.

You've been around them all your life?

bought it was in the spring that we put the jack on. But

12

A.

Yeah. When I went to college I took physics and

ve had been working on the trailer when Bob requested to put

13

geometry and spindles and rotaries, civil engineering. And

its truck in there. That's why it was under the shed. And

14

I've got some good people that installs jacks and also I got

#e bought this brand-new jack and it had never been out of

15

their information.

lie shed since we had put that jack on it. We had been

16

And I don't know how many trailers we've got, but

Forking on that jack and getting it — it was a brand-new

17

we've probably got 30 trailers that's all got jacks on them.

ick.

18

And most of them we put them on. We've got several jacks

19

with the same application. At the time that was the best

Q.

So how long had you been working on it?

A.

I don't know. You know, I don't know how long it

20

jack we could buy. We bought it up to Lone Tree. We asked

21

them if it was the best jack. They said it's the best jack

Were you doing the work or was someone else?

22

we've got for that application.

A.

I did most of the work myself.

23

Q.

So is it this jack in the picture that you

24

id been under the shed.
Q.

•tailed?

25
19

Q.

When Robert came to work on his truck did he have

your permission to do that?
A.

Well, he had the permission to put the truck under
20

<>$[

i

my snea. And this was — happened

2

he needed to put his truck. So I don't know if I told — I

2

days a year. He didn't work the same all the time.

3

can't remember talking to Bob about that. And I don't know

3

BY MR. HATCH:

4

who asked for permission, but I fully agreed that he could

4

Q.

5

put his truck under there. I t was getting kind of cold or

5

recollection?

6

windy or something and he needed to keep it clean. So I

6

7

agreed to it.

8
9

ae in the stall where

1

7

And the trailer was there. I never did I don't
think say take this trailer out of here from point A to

THE Wi iNESS: I don't know if he worked 10 or 15

Somewhere in that neighborhood is your

A.

Yeah, he could have worked 20 days out of one ot

them years or something.

8

Q.

Yeah.

9

A.

But not continuous. Not bang we're going to do

10

point B. I guess he's the one that took the trailer out. I

11

went up there and the trailer was out. I don't even know

11

12

where they parked it. But the trailer was out and his truck

12

13

was under the shed, which was what I anticipated.

13

10

this. No.
Q.

Okay. AH right. Tell us what you remember about

Septembers, 2001.
A.

Well, I went to the feed lot and the gate was

14

Q.

Was he still working with you at that time?

14

open. And I kind of thought that was different, but that

15

A.

No. He was in the trucking business hisself.

15

could have happened anywhere. So I went on over to the

16

Q.

So you had already made your split?

16

shed. And Bob was over there using my torch and cutting o

7

A.

Yeah, I told him prior to that. But he was up

17

something. I thought it was the top of a 50 gallon barrel.

18

I t was something to do with his dog pen or something.

8

against it. He needed a place to fix his truck. So I

9

thought what the heck. You know, you always try to get

0

along.

1

Q.

2

During the time you worked together how many days

a year would you estimate he worked for you?

I 19

And I don't know. We walked in the shed and went

20

along the side of the trailer. I said, I've got to move

21

this out. And Bob said, I know how to move it out, or

22

something like that. And I was in ahead of him and he was

3

MS. SHAPIRO: Objection. Asked and answered.

23

behind me. And the next thing I knew he was headed towar

I

THE WITNESS: I think we covered that, didn't we?

24

the trailer, which we was right within two feet of it

>

MS. SHAPIRO: You can go ahead and answer again.

25

anyway.

21

22

And I seen him start to kneel down and I said,

[ 1

Bob, don't touch that trailer. Them is the exact words I

2

Robert being. Just put an X where he was kneeling.
A.

Well, this trailer was up in the shed.

said. And, you know, he was that fast. He was on the way

3

Q.

Right.

and God darn he pulled that son of a gun pin. And that

4

A.

And on the cement floor. But it was basically the

trailer is heavy Just like the weight on it says. And it's

5

same angle and everything. And we had walked along this

made so it tips ahead, you know, it comes ahead. It's a two

6

side because this side was the side of the shed. I t was

axle with a pivot in the middle just like a teetertotter.

7

kind of a tight fit in there — two or three feet on each

But it's off-center so it falls ahead.

8

side. We was walking along the side and he was in back of

9

me.

And down it came on his knee. He kneeled down on
the ground with one knee and then one knee was upright. And

10

the trailer part came down and caught the knee that was

11

from the back of the trailer past the two tires in the
front.

parallel with the — his knee was up and down and the

12

trailer was like a T and the trailer fell on his knee. And

13

he had a pair of rubber shoes on and it didn't slide one way

14

Q.

A.

Just for the record he's showing that he's walking

This is where it hinges. He had to lift this up.

And he kneeled down — I know he kneeled down. He kneeled

or the other. And all that immediate weight and his foot

15

down I think with this left knee and then he left the other

didn't slide so I guess it went to the ankle where it's the

16

one straight up — it was in the upright position.

weakest.

17

Q.

Can you -- let's step back just a minute. What

did you do in preparation for your deposition?
A.

I haven't done anything. I haven't done a thing.

And then he pulled this pin. You know, if his

18

foot or knee would have been out from under the trailer it

19

wouldn't have fell on him. He had to get down — well, he

20

did. I guess maybe he could have reached through there with

Q.

Review anything?

21

his hand or he could have got a bar or something to pull

A.

No.

22

that out, but he didn't. He just reached down there and
pulled it up. And there was nothing —

Q.

Have you seen the videotape?

23

A.

No, I haven't seen any video.

24

Q.

If you can mark on Exhibit 3 an X where you recall

25

23

MS. SHAPIRO: Ray, he just wants you to mark an X
where Mr. Kearl was.
24

*

ere's a rele

BY MR. HATCH:
Q.

" ^ e s .- *» i i< r there,

Where aiuiitj mv iiiinei Wii'i nit hrirunnij if you can

j ihd

: i .e ta'K

„ -rout the

mark an X there.
, L.

I til link he 'was kneeling about right in here

think that's where he was kneeling

'-•::*- *

I

And he reached under

1

_ *.. : t _

rf"«*x*

-

Maybe it was a little farther ahead right there,

:*. *

r

Okay.

through here I think that would have been it.

And it is

1,

« ,nv

i.»i i. *w ii wavy line underneath the jack and an X

-

I t was to the side of it. He was in this area

13

HS

A

. - . .

it

oi ten inches.

.

What are

Okay. Could he have been kneeling over by this
A.

*

3vei tl lere?

The jack.
MS 5 HAP Re

:orner here?
He couldn't have reached this jack

>H^PIRl/

RY MR MA

INI
Q.

vn And he had

~ *

somewhere. I t could have been a little bigger than that
Q.

«

You see it's over there — I don't

-

A

*vO * ^r ow where it was
.

,..*. ...<*».<^«. I t s not right on

* **>*» *• -tiler

| 12

you ve goI:

I-.

But: the one that could have been there through here right

iiijht

<•

t it's in a tu ** * * n * *

here to pull it up with this knee.

.'t

ightdown

No * l ^ ; a o

T ' b t - w r * . bs

I fe wasn't ovei

^ 3 haft of the

by that corner at all.
Q.

"

All right. And the corner we're talk.ii ig allboii it

-

H*
ku

just for the record is — I'll just put a zero by it.

k at it if

There's two yellow lights right here. We're talking about
j -ei

this corner here,
A

NJX of them or
II il 111! '

He was past that corner. He reached this w i t h

-oi 'ten , /one else there but you

his — I think he reached down with his right hand and got
that. You can't see it here in this photo too good but

28

II l l ,

A.

1

No. I don't recall when I first come up if the

it. So when you let the jack down it hits the back of the
••vp

kids was there. I f they were they left. They wasn't there
when this happened. I don't remember if them kids was there
and then they come back or not. I know Bob and I was the
only ones under the shed. When I first came up I don't know

• n falling on the ground.

ii

i see.

A.

I f it's over a pin so you can move it. I was not

prepared to move it that day.

if the kids were this re or not.

Q

in ou didn't have a truck?

B

I don't km IOW if 1 had a truck oi if I had the car,,

Q.

Okay,

A.

I don't think they were.

Bi it anyway I wasn't

MS. SHAPIRO; It's okay.

have a feed yard up there and I went up there not thinking

BY MR HA r a i:
Q.

What were you planning to do with the traiiei at

anything about moving t h a t trailer that day
•

I

in 1:1 did plar

on moving it eventually.

the time that the injury took place?

iQl

Okay. So when you said - didn't you say

MS. SHAPIRO: That day""

13

MR. HATCH: Right,

14

THE WITNESS: I was planning to do i lotl nil ig with

15

know, he had done a good job. He had put the trailer back

16

where he found it. I said, Well, I've got to move this

it.

3Y MR, HATCH:
Q,

I didn't: go up there explicitly

Were you planning to move it out of the way?

something to Robert: about moving it?
A.

He followed me in the shed and I said, Well • you

trailer out of here sometime,
18

i

" v iiii

L

/UM have lo ninve 't out?

\

No, not that day. Not at all, no.

19

Q.

Okay,

20

it out and you do something else. I don't know what else

I didn't go up there prepared to move the jack.

21

had to do but we service our — somewhat we serwice our
trucks there. At that time we was a little bit.

Q.

Move the trailer?

22

A

Move the trailer, I don't know if I was in my car

23

11

i

11 I s d % h o | I

f i J u ii 11 line p r oj e c t a n d t h e n v o u m o \ P

You know, it's a place where yuu we ijot your

T if I was in my truck. I f you're going to move this

24

i veldci

It's a shop. You manufacture Ihings in Iheie.

railer you're going to have to h a w i tinck to biicik IJIIII(II?(

25

We've done a lot of work in there. Sonn-Innes it's been d
d8

-

i
2
3

pretty Dusy little place.

1

Q.

So you did not expect Robert to do anything?

A.

No. He went in with me and I think he was

2
3

4

enthusiastic. He had been the only one that had moved it

4

5

since — you know, he had moved it. You know, to put his

5

6

truck in there he had to or somebody had to back up to that

6

7

trailer, let it down with that same jack, hook it onto his

7

8

trailer, pull it outside and park it, and then go through

8

9

the same ritual again to unhook it.

9

best of your reconection did it have a water tank on it?
A.

No.

Q.

And was this the same jack that was on it at the

time of the injury?
A.

Yes, sir. That's the same vehicle.

Q.

When you pull on this jack — or the release,

excuse me, does it rachet down to the ground?
A.

Yes, it does. I t rachets down — if you hold it

up it will slip clear to the ground. The trailer didn't go

10

He had to jack it up again, use everything on this

10

clear to the ground. When you pull the pin it stays about

11

jack to get up so he could pull his truck out from under it.

11

eight or ten inches off the ground or it would have cut hi:

12

That was the first time.

12

leg right off.

13
4

Then he fixed his truck and ever how many days

13

later — whether it was a week or ten days or two weeks I

14

5

don't know — then he had — he put it back. That's where

15

6

he picked it up so that's where he put it back.

7
8
9

I see. So if you pull the release describe for us

what happens.
A.

I f you pull the release it's just like an

16

elevator, no stops on it. I t goes right straight to the

Q.

Why weren't you planning to move it that day?

17

lowest thing if you hold it up.

A.

Well, maybe it was the mood I was in. Maybe I had

18

a busy commitment. I can't tell you.

1

19

MS. SHAPIRO: That's fine, Ray. You answered his

I

question.

\

BY MR. HATCH:

I

Q.

Q.

Q.

Okay.

A.

And where it's exceptionally heavy like that it

20

doesn't just come down and rachet. I t goes just like an

21

elevator dropping. That's the way I would describe.

22

But if you let up off of it - it's spring

Now, this trailer has a double axle, right?

23

operated and if you let up off of it then it's going to fall

24

in the next slot, which is about an inch or an inch and a

25

half apart.

1

A.

Yes, sir.

i

Q.

At the time of the injury did it have -- to the

29
Q.

So it doesn't rachet all the way down then? It

either falls down or it hits the next slot?
A.

All right. So it won't rachet all the way to the

No. I f you release it it will not. I t goes in

the next hole.
Q.

Q.

And so in this particular case you're saying that

Robert held on to the release?
A.

Apparently he did. You know, he released it and

it didn't stop until it got down to where it didn't w a n t to

6

go any further.

7

9
10

I f you released it, it would go to the next hole.

like that.

5

8

So it either drops smoothy or it catches in the

next hole. Is that an accurate description?
A.

3
4

bottom?
A.

1
2

Yeah. I f you release it, it will go to the next

slot. I f you hold it up, it will keep going.
Q.

30

Q.

It went all the way to the bottom?

A.

I don't know if it went to the bottom or like a

teetertotter it only w e n t to where it wanted to stop. I
think this metal you see underneath it here you see it wou!<

11

hit that. But I ' m not sure if the jack if you was on flat

But if you still keep it released and keep it going until

12

cement or you let it clear down it would even hit that.

you release it, then it will go in that slot.

13

think it still rode above that. Because it just got so —

Q.

I'm sorry, I missed that.

14

it only come down so far. But you see it would hit this

A.

There's six holes up and down along here -- the

15

part first before it hit this.

shaft. I f you release it, it releases it out of one and it

16

Q.

Okay. So in this particular case did it rachet

drops. I t ' s a heavy trailer so it drops. But if you just

17

release it and then let off from it —

18

A.

No. He just pulled it and down it went.

19

Q.

And it dropped?

A.

Yeah, it did drop. I t was brand-new. I t had

Q.

Let go of it?

A.

Yeah. It's spring loaded. I t would have went

into the next hole.

20
21

I

down? Did he take it down in stages?

never been used before.

Q.

And stopped?

A.

Yeah. That's the way they're designed.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

have welded it up a little more, you know, but it never bent

A.

I t ' s a heavy jack. It's made for heavy equipment

25

or nothing.

22

31

Q.

The installation was complete?

A.

Yeah, the installation was complete. You might

32

C

v*.

nda you tried it out while ycx,

1

jre installing it?

Yeah, w e t r i e d t h e jack o u t .
1

2

A.

No, I'm t a l k i n g about this circle that, you hook

onto the truck, This fits over n hull oi it fits into some

m moved it up and down and it worked okay?

3

kind of a p e n d u l u m . We put it owe? J ball

i " i ii » We felt confident enough we w e n t back

4

hole like a four inch hole. And i t j u s t falls d o w n over a

5

ball. That was good enough to move it.

and hought. four or five more of t h e m

H's just a l»ic],

They've got a better hookup to move it up and dow

ti

MnVfi you had any problems with it?

A.

No. You know, as time goes on they kind of r u s t

the road. Like if you was going to move it down the highwa

up a little bit and you have to service them. But this jack

or something there's some kind of 1,1 pendulum hitch that

was brand-new and it was just taken out of the wrapper. I t

locks over the top of i t so it can't come dp off f r o m thei e

had never been out in the open. I t had never been out from

But to move the trailer you would just let it down

under t h a t shed.
Q.

mi thai

fust to move it outside.

When you knee! down by the jack to pull the

release is your knee naturally under it?
MS. SHAPIRO: Are vou talkinq hv • -

-

/?

>!

Whet e were you standing?

i t,

f was in f r o n t of it

MR. HATCH: Ye*

il

i HI:; WITNESS: N< .
keep your knee out from una^f

«H

i j . f i > *

- ^

J ; KJK -

have this block so it can't come clown,

jUM

put

»;»»-/»•""

,i ; 'H; • ma-t enc. •

• h rt vt -^v1 t

front. The secret is you have a truck backed up here or

This side of It.
j

*

i i iark it that

would be <">5
18
*I

Q

Tl-

-'

^

jihead :r *i,~. « jrned around

and I lorkeo M tier jettire -°^dv *o gt - -A-

** -e to move

it and that's when I said, Bob, don1!: tot jch that ti'rii'er'

BY MR HATCI i:
Q.

I t ' s so heavy on the f r o n t it w o u l d n ' t bounce off

BY MR. HATCH:

Yeah. Just for the record he's pointing to the

1

1

tip of the tongue.

liaybe you can put
was fihuiid of M m . I doi I't k n o w how far 1 was •

A.

That's right.

Q.

And there's a box underneath the tongue and

24

there's a box that hangs down. And he's pointing to that.

25

ahead of him. At that time we w a s pretty close together.
Q.

Circle around it where you are.
34

33
Somewhere like that.

1

of h i m . I noticed him. He's fast and I noticed him trying

What were you doing at the time it happened?

.i!

to act like ha was getting in motion to touch that jack.

I was telling him not to touch that trailer.

„"!

I""1111 limn .I", 1 didn't w a n t to touch t h a t j a c k . And nothing was

So you were standing behind him?

4

under "t. "'. could see him moving towards t h a t jacK and 1

5

d i d n ' t want h i m to touch it. I w a r n e d him

•round. We had just walked along t h e side of this truck,

6

don't touch that trailer.

uid we had been talking and I didn't have any intention,

7

vas standing in front of him. 1 had t u r n e d

here wasn't a truck backed up to it. We weren't preparer
o move the trailer. The door in front of this — this

1 <MII 1. 11 I,

Q.

What way were you facing?

A

At that time I had t u r n e d around and 1 was facing

I!: ai id I le was coming east t o get under the trailer.

rhite door on this shed right here it was closed, W r '

10

CI.

So you were facing the jack?

i any intention of moving that trailer.

11

A.

No. I was facing Bob. The jack was south. And 1

Q.

What door did you go in?

12

seen him kind of like he was going down to monkey release

A.

There's a side door right to t h e side of this

13

this jack oi whatever his action. And I saw him start t o

14

move

15

and I had t h a t long of a time to tell him

hite door.
••<»*?

-• £iit here. We j u s t w a l k e d in here.

^

above tne

jack

on tne

ec >.-*jd. The shop. This is the shop.
Q.

;

-o you were standing where you cO'Uid see clearly

3t he was doing?
A.

the side, /

pj C ture,

Well, it's over here on this shed that's; part of
a

I didn't

But anyway at that time w e had been w a l k i n g along

On Exhibit 3 he's pointing to the white door

,•..,. r j g n t

And he started to move

hesitate and I said it plenty loud.

e didn't open this big door.
Q,

He was probably back: here

I had been walking ahead of h i m . I don't know if

had hesitated t h e r e . But I was orobahiv three f e e t anea ;

understa-'
20
21
*~*
I

.i T ~ij p ned around and was trying to make him
;

- "

~ ."-•

^

Q.

Okay, So you were facing Bob?

A.

Yeah. He was coming east: and I was turned around

to look at him w e s t .
A

Do vou recall what leg he injured?

A

Vti J*

" thought he kneeled d o w n with his left leg

find tridt thing came <iown on his r i g h t leg.
16

i
2

u.

so his left knee was on the gi.

d and his right

I

1

knee was up?

A.

I t was certainly out of proportion. You could see

2

what had happened. His leg had been upright and that w<

3

A.

That's right.

3

had hit there. He had these rubber soled shoes on and it

4

Q.

Okay. After it happened what happened next once

4

made the grip good. I t didn't slide any way. I t didn't

5

slide east, west, north or south. I t just stayed there

6

until it broke.

5
6
7

the trailer came down?
A.

Well, it was a hell of a thing. You know, I could

see what had happened.

7

I guess it could have broke his ankle — not broke

8

Q.

As I understand it there was no ratcheting sound?

8

his ankle but broke his leg. But instead of that I guess it

9

A.

Oh, no. I t just came down.

9

went to the weakest part in the ankle. And the foot stayed

10

Q.

It just came down?

10

in the position and then his ankle did give. So it slid

A.

I t happened in two seconds. I don't know, maybe

11

over to the side of his foot. And you could see that. You

12

could see that.

11
12

less than that. And, you know, if it hadn't equalized

13

itself it would have kept coming down. I don't think it

14

ever did hit any of these parts on the cement. That being

14

15

the case he could get his leg — if this would have just

15

the boy actually drove over to the hospital hisself. I

16

dropped right on the cement it would have pinned him under

16

don't know if his wife was working or not. I followed him

7

there.

17

on over. And I stopped and told my wife and they came ovc

I 13

He got in his truck and I think he went down to
his house and I followed him on down to his house. I think

8

Q.

Did you say anything else?

18

That's as much as I remember about it. But that's exactly

9

A.

I said, you know, Bob let me get you — I think I

19

what happened.

0

was in the car. I said, Let me get you in the car. Let me

20

1

drive you. And he said, No, no. I want to take my truck.

2

And he hobbled out of there. I t was unbelievable.

I

I looked at his leg. I t all happened that fast — or his

I

ankle.

i

Q.

What did it look like?

Q.

I think you indicated that it was his right leg he

21

Injured. Could it have been his left? Could you be mixed

22

up there?

23

A.

I've never thought about it since then. I think

24

that was the position he was in. I t could have been. I

25

don't know how he positioned hisself. But he kneeled down

37
with one knee definitely and one was up.

38
1

Q.

Thank you. Has there been some confusion in your

Q.

Okay. Did you say anything else to him?

2

A.

No. We was just aghast at what had happened, you

3

A.

Not one damn bit on my part.
How sure are you that this is the trailer?

know. I wasn't going to say anything. The best thing was

mind about which trailer it was?

4

Q.

to try to get him some help. I offered to put him in my

5

A.

I'm 110 percent sure.

truck or take him in our car. I don't remember which I was

6

Q.

Okay. Do you remember meeting with me up at your

in. But he was stubborn enough he said, No, I want to

7

drive. And he did and I followed him out of the yard.

8
9

Q.

Did you drive over to his home?

A.

I went down by there. Yeah, I'm sure I did.

10

Q.

Did you talk to him there?

II

A.

I don't remember. But I know we all ended up over

12

farm?
A.

Yeah, I remember you coming in there one or two or

three times.
Q.

Do you remember us meeting last winter when there

was snow on the ground?
A.

Not particularly. I remember one time you came in

13

there with Bob or something. I don't know if I talked to

Q.

Did you say anything like I'm sorry?

14

you that day or not.

A.

Well, I could have done. I t was a sorry deal any

15

at the hospital.

of i t Not that I'm sorry or personally responsible.
I guess by having him up on the property I'd be
personally responsible. I don't know. I told him not to

(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 4 was marked

16

for identification.)

17

BY MR. HATCH:

18

Q.

I show you what's been marked as Exhibit 4. Is

come up on the property. I let him in there to fix his

19

truck and after that I didn't intend on him being up

20

A.

Yeah.

there.

21

Q.

Do you remember that?

A.

Well, I remember being there with you. I don't

that you in the picture?

Sure I was sorry the accident had happened. You

22

know, if he had died or broke his leg or it would have been

23

know if this was the trailer. Is this the trailer we're

my daughter I would have been sorry. Or his grandkid or you

24

talking about?

or anybody I would have been sorry that thing happened.

25

39

Q.

Well, do you remember showing me that trailer?

M

ci y udiier 1 naa up
2
3
4

;

,---nerr.;••,-• -. -o.vmg me where Bob was standing

a -'ng'e axle trailer, It's one of the lighter ones

A,

•i

I remember it just as I toid you. I would have

6

t o i d you that then and I would have told you that now. I've

7

got no reason — he had t o be d o w n t h e r e t o pull t h e pin to

6
7

B

pull that release.

0*

9

Q

Do you remember how we got up there?

}

A

We drove up there in your tn tick: or something

didn't w e . I don't remember.

!

Q

Could it have been your car?

I

*

1 don't know. I don't know w h e n this piciu.«.

I

-\PIRO: I'm sorry, can you repeat what type

•1E WITNESS: Well, it's a military trailer, but

when it happened?

5

I

S , :;

there

taken if w e had this trailei back, I've only got t w o of

» these t r a i l e r s and the other one had a water tank on it
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 5 was marked
ntification.)
(W h e re u po n, a n < > M M1t» i e t«111J 111 * r 11 •." • 11111 , ( i ' .

. *.< -^-e show you what's been marked as Exmui
* /ou if you can identify that?
A,

Can I identify it?

Q.

Can you identify it?

A.

Sure, I can. If: s my little light trailer.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

• QC ', It's a different kind of jack. It works

kino *)- on trie same principle but it's not set i ip like this
"ner

<<*

I nevei told you it was th1-.
This is the trailer it is or it's this tra^.

on it,

|

BV MR. HATCH:
Q.

oi i a light trailei
Q.

Do you recall showing me that jack?

A.

Yeah, I s h o w e d you the different kind of jacks

around there.
CI

Do you f ecall why yoi i showed me that jack?

A.

No. 1 1 » tfo i 10 i eason. Just t o s h o w that there

was different kinds of jacks. And the t r a i l e r s y o u seemed
to be more interested in all the trailers. There are
d i f f e r e n t k i n d of j a c k s .
_ _

a.
U,

MR. HATCH; Yeah, holier if you want a break.

a full set of these pictures that apparently were taken
during the winter I would assume last year when you were oi»
Mr. Okelberry's property.
MR. HATCH: Right. You're entitled to those,
THE WITNESS: So are you through with 5"'
BY MR HATCH:
I hrough with 5 unless you can remember anything

2lse about that jack:. Now, that jack: has a pin that pulls
)Ut?
A,

t'es. i n s t e a d of — i t ' s not as heavy-duty of a

ack as t h a t other one. I t ' s probably a 3,000 pound jack
where the other is a 1 2 , 0 0 0 pound jack.
""J

42

Is that your car in the picture?

ukay. Could it have been a trailer that looked

ili.it
Nil

his is a single a x l e t r a i l e r . This doesn't

even have a jack: on i t . This has got a jack, but it's

MS. SHAPIRO: Just for the record I would request

Q

\b

A.

THE WITNESS; No, I'm great.

_

i ««f « l r .

for identification.)
MS. SHAPIRO. Do you need to take a break or are

Yeah, that's my walker. And I k n o w the trailer.

I know the jack and the kind of a trailer it was on. I t was

:n,^ No, 6 was marked

you all right?

Okay. Pointing to 4 and 3 — Exhibit 4 and 3.

Is that your walker in the picture?
A.

Oka(Whereu^.

* u nnk at

the time that I was up there with you it had the water tank

41

Q.

M^, s, never

"lould it have been a jack like that?

A.

No.

Q

Let's look at 6.

A.

Okay. Th i s i s j u s ir • 11 I »
i mi i m t • i w a r s u r D I I i s I r 11 i p r

i t h a w a t e r tank on it.
43

7 folded d o w n on 1:1 le ground. I t ' s laying right straight on
8 the ground.
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No, 7 was marked
9
10 for identification.)
1 1 BY MR, HA1 CH:
Q. SI IOW yoi i what's beei i marked as Exhibit / . Can you
12
13 tell us what that is?
A.
I t looks like that trailer that w e had been
14
15 t a l k i n g a b o u t .
- -railer in Exhibit —
16
17
18
A.
I really can't see e n o u g h of it But I've only
19
20 got two of those trailers, I d o n ' t know if a n y t h i n g is on
21 that trailer or not.
Q. Okay. Do you recall i neasuring from the corner to
22
|
23 the tongue?
n
1 can't: remember that. W h a t ' s t h i s black part up
24
25 here? Whi it's this I >lack pai t?
44

l\

1

up on the hill w».

You know, I don't know which one of these trailers

2

And I want to make corrections on that other one. It's the

3

you're talking about. They're both the same. They'd be the

3

same picture and it is not the trailer. Where is this one?

4

same measurements. I don't know if that's the water tank.

4

MS. SHAPIRO: This one?

5

But if that's the water tank that's not the same trailer.

5

THE WITNESS: No, that's a little light trailer.

2

A.

6

This is not the same trailer. I can tell you.

6

7

This jack is mounted on the other side. This is the trailer

7

8

up on top of the hill with the water tank on it. So, no, 5

8

9

would be —

9

10

MS. SHAPIRO: This is 7.

11

10

THE WITNESS: It's the same one. That's not the

- this is the water trough trailer.

This one right here.
MS. SHAPIRO: Exhibit 4?
THE WITNESS: This one you can't see. I don't
know where he was on this one. With just showing this much
of the trailer I can't tell. You can't see where the jack

11

is. This picture doesn't give enough detail. But I would

12

trailer it was. You're not showing the water tank on it.

12

assume it's this same trailer.

13

You're just showing a little bit of snow on the front part

13

MS. SHAPIRO: As Exhibit 7?

14

of it. This black part is the water tank. I can tell the

14

15

jack — this jack — the other jack would have been back

15

I think that's the water tank. And if I remember right it

6

here farther. The other jack was back under these name

16

was up on top of the hill. These two are not the trailers

7

plates on it. This is not the trailer.

8
9

MS. SHAPIRO: Just for the record he's referring
to Exhibit 7. When he references the jack would be back

17

you're looking at. They're sisters. But one has got a

18

water tank on it and one has got a flat bed.

19

BY MR. HATCH:

0

further he's talking about just above where the silver part

20

t

of the tape measure is.

21

1

THE WITNESS: No, over here. The trailer that

THE WITNESS: I think so. You see this black part

22

Q.

Okay. We met a couple of times to inspect the

trailer at your farm?
A.

I t seems like to me you was up there three times.

\

you're talking about that Bob pulled the pin on is right

23

And I don't know how many times without me. So I don't

\

adjacent to this right here.

24

know.

25

Q.

I

This is not the trailer. This is the one that's

Now, after we've looked at all these your

45
testimony is that Exhibit 3 is the trailer?
A.

46
1

That's right. And probably last winter when you

2

BY MR. HATCH:
Q.

I'll show you what's been marked as Exhibit 8. Is

took this picture you went up there and I showed you this

3

sister trailer. And it had the water tank on it. I think

4

A.

Yes, sir.

it's kind of coming back to me here. But this trailer was

5

Q.

I understand you've already stated that the

out to the desert and they hadn't brought it home at that

6

trailer involved in the accident was a double axle. This is

7

a single axle. Is that correct?

time.
Q.

Exhibit 3?

A.

Yeah. I t was out to Nevada and they brought it

8

back.
Q.

Okay.

A.

9

this one of your trailers?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

After you viewed all of these trailers — and I'm

10

not trying to put words in your mouth, but I want to make

11

sure that we understand what your testimony is. Has your

And it never was there. This is not the trailer.

12

testimony changed? Are you confident that Exhibit 3 is the

I want it perfectly clear that those two pictures are not

13

trailer?

the trailer.

14

A.

I'm just as sure as you're sitting in that chair.

Q.

Okay. Was there ever any confusion in your mind

MS. SHAPIRO: Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 4. Is that
correct?

15
16

THE WITNESS: That's right. Neither one of them

17

about which trailer it was?
A.

No. I had two of them. That's kind of — no.

shows the tank on the trailer nor do they show the jack.

18

One had a water tank on it. One was a fiat bed. You can

BY MR. HATCH:

19

see I was in a waiker when I come out there and showed you.

20

My mind was good. I know which trailers they were. I did

a little break. I want to ask him about one more picture

21

the work on both of them.

I'm going to get.

22

Q.

Okay. I think we're about done. Let me just take

(Whereupon, a recess was taken?)

23

(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 8 was marked
or identification.)

24
25

47

Q.

You say —
MR. HATCH: Can you read that back.

(Whereupon, the question was read back by the
court reporter.)
48

,,.._ ». A ,,VL.JO. M»IU men i

neipers help me with

2

them trailers,

2

3

BY MR. HATCH:

3

4
5

Q

Anything else you can remember aocuv

Do you use the jack

4

Yes r w e do use that type of jack. That's a
.*u.

yjck t h a n on t h a t big heavy trailer.

No. Here you've come in here w i t h , y o u ,_~ ~

A.

ou use that only on single axle?
/e've been k n o w n to put heavy j a c k s on lighter

three different seasons — or two different seasot
v and that. That was last winter,

8

Q

9

Right.

)
I

MS. SHAPIRO; He's just asking about the accidei it.

10

rHE WITNESS: No, I cant tell anything.

11 !

A^CH:
l

" jse pictures last winter concern you?

-

trailers.
Q.

I mean tl lis jack on Exhibit 5.

A.

That's a — see y o u d o n ' t show r I In- h i i l n p I I I,

Ibbi il « a sirtjlt, ii*!.,,,

12

Q.

is il only on single axles?

13

A

No, W> vc got: one whei e I t o o k t w o of the

trailers and welded t h e m together

ve identified them and I know right w h e t e
•

the type of jack that's on

Exhibit 5 do you use that type of jack anymore?

the accident that you haven't told us about?

6
7

Ail i igt it

Q.

But they'i e still

lightweight. This is a l i g h t w e i g h t j a c k

-* r »**ai trailer is still right there in t h a t

I t ' s a medium

weight jack,
Q.

Okay,

A.

This t r a i l e r it's — I don't k n o w h o w m a n y we've

Q

19

got of them. We've got a lot of t h e m
Q

A lot of trailers?

A

Yes

So you 1 lave one double axle trailer that has a

^ck like shown in Exhibit 5?

20

MS, SHAPIRO: Object to the extent it misstates
»-• •

•

ny.

You know that. A n d some w e use more t h a n

others. But, you know, everybody

w e ' v e probably got 13,

I HE WH N" "

22

\

>u ask?

15 employees and they've used these trailers.
MS. SHAPIRO: Ray, that's fine. He ha

. m dskir* '' you have a double axle trailer that

iiniilii

,-.r ar

you a question. Let him ask a question.

the jack in Exhibit 5?
50

49
Q

I haven't checked and It could be. There's one of

these where I took two little lightweight trailers and put
C e R T i F ..

together.

one

T

Q.

Okay.

A.

But it couldn't swing down. So that's the only

~ ATE OF -JT-

-^

All right. Okay. Thank you.

lERTIFY that the deposition of EDWIN RAY

KELBERRY, the witness in the foregoing deposition named,

MS. SHAPIRO: You're done. We'll reserve the

^ .is rake-

>efore me, DANIEL, t LITTLE, a Certified Shorthand

.*f.-f-rter and Notary Public ^ :\ v. for the State of Utah,

right to read and sign. You can send it to me.
(Whereupon, the deposition concluded ,-

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAM )

I don't k n o w w h a t j a c k is on that trailer.
Q.

i r =•

>

10

residing at Salt Lake City, Utah. That the said witness,

11

was by me, before examination, duly sworn to testify the

12

truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth in said

13

cause.

14
15

That the testimony of said witness was reported by me in
Stenotype and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into

16

typewriting, and that a full, true and correct transcription

17

of said testimony so taken and transcribed, is set forth in

18

the forego*' <; pages,

19

\\ '*-^-T -"-tifv 'fiai • am not of kin or otherwise

20

associated with any of the parties to said cause of action,.

21

and that I am not interested in the event thereof

22
23
24

WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City \ Itah
this 24th day of January, 2006,
.

25
52

3

1 these were all provided ,t• •»M; i V • **: • n.
2
"'

MR. HATCH: Okay. So you've got about an., inch
\ i M ill! tltC II. ( I llll Hi'"'

1
*

MS. SHAPIRO: Or less. It looks like certainly
u:

s surgical record1" frop- Dr. McArthur: Dr. Clegg's records;

7 BY MR. HATCH:
8

Q.

A 11
. right. So you. reviewed some of those

9 records ~

11
12

*

Yes.

Q.

— \ v hei I the) were sent to ) oi I?
Tell us what ~ let's step back a minute and talk

13 about your background. Do you. have any expertise in
1I

jiiiifoniy?

15

MS. SHAPIRO: I'm going to object, to the extent it

", H

a'iV". I'OV a legal conclusion whether or not "he's an expert.

17 i k can describe his background.
18
19

THE WITNESS: Well, I minored in bioengineering
li

v hen I was getting i n> Ph.D. at I Iiiiversit;; r of I exas, That

20 meant that 1 had to take three courses that dealt with -

21 graduate level courses that dealt with bioengineering
22 issues. Anatomy was not a focal point of that.
23

I took a systemic physiology class. I took a

24 neurophysiology of movement class. And I took a
25 biomechanics class. That was a class team taught by two

DANIELLE LITTLE -- DEPOMAXMERIT
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1 mechanical engineers and an orthopedic surgeon that tean}
2 taught this biomechanics class.
3

That class probably relates more closely to the

4 aspects of this. If you're looking for training that would
5 relate to this accident that's probably the most specific.
6 BY MR. HATCH:
7

Q.

The biomechanics class?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

You had one class?

10

A.

Well, it was a graduate level class focused on

11 biomechanics. I've had a lot of mechanics courses and otl^er
12 kinds of things and I've taught mechanics courses. But th^t
13 one was specifically a biomechanics class that focused on
14 these kinds of issues.
15

Q.

So when did you have the biomechanics class?

16

A.

That was probably 1972, something like that. I'm

17 not sure exactly without going back to transcripts.
18

Q.

That was one semester?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Have you had any other biomechanics classes?

21

MS. SHAPIRO: That he's taken or taught?

22

MR. HATCH: Taken.

23

THE WITNESS: I don't recall any other classes

24 that I've taken that were called biomechanics. I've taken
25 several mechanics classes.

DANIELLE LITTLE -- DEPOMAXMERIT
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5 BY MR. HATCH:
6

Q.

Do you hold yourself out as having expertise

7 regarding the knee j oint?
8

MS. SHAPIRO: Same objection. Overbroad, object

9 to the form.
10 BY MR. HATCH:
11

Q.

You can answer even though she objects.

12

A.

My first impression would be, no, probably not. I

13 don't study the knee joint in great detail. However, I do
14 remember in the biomechanics classes spending quite a bit'of
15 time talking about the knee joint. It's interesting how low
16 in friction the knee j oint is for example.
17

So there's some aspects of the knee joint that I

18 might understand as well or better than some others. But
19 the knee joint in general is something that I don't spend a
20 lot of time focusing on, no.

21

Q. How about the hip? Same with the hip?

22

A. Same answer.

23

Q. How about the talor joint?

24

A. Same answer.

25

MS. SHAPIRO: Same objection. Continuing

DANIELLE LITTLE -- DEPOMAXMERIT
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23

1 objection on this line of questions.
2 BY MR. HATCH:
3

Q. So is the reason that you got a printout of the

4 ankle joint from the Internet was that to refresh your
5 understanding of the ankle so that you could —
6

A. In part, yes.

7

Q. What do you mean in part?

8

A. Well, to refresh me and to also it looked like a

9 nice diagram that could be used to refresh all of us if we
10 wanted to talk about it.
11

Q. Okay. Anything else you can think ofthat you did

12 in preparation for your opinion other than what we've talked
13 about? I guess we could talk about this.
14

(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 2 was marked

15 for identification.)
16 BY MR. HATCH:
17

Q. I'll show you what's been marked as Exhibit 2.

18 Can you tell us what that is?
19

A. This is a description and I guess instructions

20 regarding a jack that is similar to the jack that was

21 involved in this accident. And this was part of
22 Mr. Ingebretsen's file I believe. And that's where I got it
23 was from his — either his file or report. I'm not sure
24 which.
25

Q. Did you review it and use it in forming your

DANIELLE LITTLE - DEPOMAXMERIT
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1 opinion?
2

A. I did.

3

Q. Other than the ankle did you study any other body

4 parts in preparation for your opinion?
5

A. Not specifically for, you know, this opinion. You

6 know, I don't know what - I'm not sure what you're
7 referring to or what other body parts 8

Q. The hip joint, the taler joint did you study

9 either of those in preparation for your opinion?
10

A. No, I didn't specifically focus on studying any

11 joints in particular. Other than the ankle joint which is
12 where the injury occurred.
13

Q. Now, let's talk about your opinion for a minute.

14 In your opinion you use some words I'd like to understand
15 how you use them. One is likely and not likely. Can you
16 tell us what you mean when you use those words?
17

MS. SHAPIRO: Object to the form.

18

THE WITNESS: I think that's self-explanatory.

19 Don't those words have meaning to you?
20 BY MR. HATCH:

21

Q. Yes. I'm wondering if they have the same meaning.

22 What do you mean when you say likely?
23

MS. SHAPIRO: Well, I'm going to object. It's

24 vague. It's ambiguous. It's out of context.
25 BY MR. HATCH:

DANIELLE LITTLE -- DEPOMAXMERIT
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conflict, because--and Ray didn't pay for Dr. Smith, he didn't
even know who Dr. Smith was and he didn't care what Dr. Smith
was going to say.

Can you--and you saw me, when I asked him,

do you know what Dr. Smith's opinion is, he said no, and I--I
thought--I was taken back, I didn't know what to say.

I

couldn't imagine a party coming to trial and not knowing what
their expert was going to say.
was going to, say.
saw me stutter.

Ray had no idea what Dr. Smith

It just took me back, I--I stuttered, you

And so, Ray didn't pay for Dr. Smith.

The--

let's just say, someone on the defense team paid for Dr.
Smith-MS. SHAPIRO:

Your Honor, I'm sorry, we're treading

on some pretty thin ground right now.
THE COURT:

Don't discuss that anymore, Mr. Hatch.

It's already been established counsel hired him.

Don't go any

further with it.
MR. HATCH:

Counsel hired Dr. Smith.

And I--I

didn't think I was going any further, but, so there's a
dispute.
When Ray was frozen in place with that video, he
still--he thought, at the time, it was the right knee and
remember, right is wrong, it was the left knee.

And as it

became apparent, as the case progressed and it became apparent
that the left knee was involved and the left knee wasn't in as
good a place to be injured, just remember, Ray is the second
36
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KEARL,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

vs.

Case No: 050401593 PI

EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

GARY D STOTT
October 24, 2007

keris

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DENTON M HATCH
Defendant's Attorney(s): RUTH A SHAPIRO
Audio
Tape Number:
07-403-53
Tape Count: 9:02-10:28

HEARING
This matter comes before the Court for a final pretrial
conference. There are several issues to be addressed by the Court
and counsel. Mr. Hatch indicates the status of mediation. Ms.
Shapiro in response.
Ms. Shapiro addresses her objections to Plaintiff's exhibits. Mr.
Hatch in response.
The Court indicates that a summary of medical expenses will be
accepted. However, all itemized expenses must be agreed to by both
parties. The Court will exclude the medical records themselves.
As to damages, the Court will allow that exhibit only for
illustrative purposes.
The Court orders that no evidence or arguments regarding
Plaintiff's plans for any money received will go to the jury.
The Court goes through the pictures Plaintiff intends to submit.
The pictures will be marked as A through whatever appropriate
letter it ends on. The photo showing the trailer tongue will be
pulled, and 2 other photos will need proper foundation.
Exhibit 25 will be allowed.
The Court and counsel discuss the questionnaire that will be given
Page 1

Case No: 050401593
Date:
Oct 24, 2007
to the jury panel.
Two motions in limine are addressed: the motion in limine
regarding Dr. Craig Smith, and the motion in limine regarding
Colorado Casualty. Mr. Hatch and Ms. Shapiro present their
arguments.
The Court indicates that counsel will be subject to the rule
compliance. The experts may testify in accordance with those
guidelines. Plaintiff may not bring in Colorado Casualty.
The motion in limine regarding the children's testimony is
addressed by Ms. Shapiro and Mr. Hatch.
The Court orders that the children may testify as to their
father's physical damages, but no testimony touching on people
lying will be allowed.
The motion in limine regarding Plaintiff's felony charges is
addressed. Ms. Shapiro and Mr. Hatch present their arguments.
The Court finds that the prejudicial effects of such testimony
outweighs the probative value. This issue will not be addressed to
the jury.
Plaintiff's motions in limine are addressed by Mr. Hatch and Ms.
Shapiro.
The Court orders that the misdemeanors will not be testified to,
as will the testimony of the wife and children relating to the
issues discussed.
There is further discussion with the Court and counsel regarding
the scheduling and jury instructions of the trial. Court is in
recess.

Page 2 (last)
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Novembe r 7, 2007, 9 55 a.m.

I'd like to ma rk as Exhibit 38,

MS. SHAPIRO
please.

Could I see that , Ruth?

MR. HATCH:
MS. SHAPIRO:

Sure>.

It's a chart of all the

recommendat ions.
We' ve never seen this before.

MR. HATCH:

MS. SHAPIRO:

I--

It's> a rebutta 1 exhibit, your Honor.

There's information underneath that wi 11 serve as [inaudible)
MR. HATCH:

I haven't had an opportunity to look at

it before, if --I don't. know what it is •
MS. SHAPIRO:

It is a summary of his

recommendations, which he's just testified to.
THE COURT:

You may use it.

MS. SHAPIRO:

It's received.

In all fairness, your Honor, there is

more information underneath that I'm going to get into.
Q

(By Ms. Shapiro)

Dr. France, if you could--I want

you to make sure that you get a look at this as well, to be
fair and make sure it's accurate.

We've marked as Exhibit

38-THE COURT:

Let's have him come down to it so he can

see it.
MS. SHAPIRO:

Sure.

Come on down.

Thank you.

And

just make sure you don't block out--thank you.
5

THE WITNESS:
Q

I'm sorry.

(By Ms. Shapiro)

I apologize.

We made a summary of your

recommendations and we've listed out, and this is from your
report, of the secondary work limitations and the out-patient/
in-patient, after care, massage therapy, sleep study, all the
way across the board and the costs that you have testified to.
Do they look generally accurate to you?
MS. SHAPIRO:

Denton, can you--Mr. Hatch, can you

make sure you don't--thank you.

Q

THE WITNESS:

That seems to be accurate.

MS. SHAPIRO:

Okay.

(By Ms. Shapiro)

Why don't you go ahead and take a

seat, please?
I'm going to hand you a report from another
evaluation you've done, Dr. France, and I don't want you to
say the name of the patient, for privacy reasons.

Do you

recall conducting an evaluation of a woman involved in an auto
accident, age 65, who injured her shoulder?
A

Yes.

Q

And you were retained by that woman's attorney;

correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And you drafted a report in that situation?

A

I did.

Q

Okay.

And the 65-year-old woman with a shoulder
6

injury was a retired school teacher; correct?
A

In this instance, yes

Q

Okay.

And why don't you go ahead and come down here

and you can bring that report.
accurate.

I want to make sure we're

We've gone through the same categories here for

that woman.

And based on your report, do these numbers look

accurate?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Go ahead and take a seat, please.

Let me hand you a report from another patient of
yours, and again, please don't mention a name.
In fact, in this situation, that's a client of Mr.
Hatch's; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

And you did a similar evaluation of that

woman as well?
A

Yes.

Q

And she was a 40--49-year-old woman with a head

injury who was unemployed at the time; is that correct?
MR. HATCH:

I'll object to these exhibits on the

grounds that they could have been provided to us, they were
foreseeable before this.
THE COURT:

The objec--and so what is your

MR. HATCH:

My objection is that since they weren't

objection?

7
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P R O C E E D I N G S

(Transcriber's Note:

Speaker identification

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

(Prior proceedings recorded but not transcribed.)
November 5, 2 007, 10:49 a.m.
THE COURT:

Mr. Harwood?

Have a seat right there,

will you, sir?
MR. HARWOOD:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Thank you very much.

Just one area of questions on--on your follow-up for
information on Question 7.
MR. HARWOOD:
THE COURT:

Okay.
--and then your answer as well--

MR. HARWOOD:
THE COURT:

I'll read that question--

Okay.
--and then tell you what I--what I need

to visit with you about.
MR. HARWOOD:
THE COURT:

Yes.
The question says, so you have any

feelings as to people who file civil lawsuits as a means of
resolving disputes?
And you put, and under "Favor", "Yes, if needed."
MR. HARWOOD:

Well, from my understanding, what I

was thinking, that if you need to settle it this way rather
3

than as a neighborly communication, then, if that's
appropriate, why civil courts would be a desirable thing.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me follow up.

The law permits people who are in

dispute over whatever the issue may be to request a jury and
to have jurors of their peers listen to the evidence and then
make a decision based upon the evidence they're given in the
courtroom and the law that the Judge gives the jurors as to
how the case should go and the jury makes the decision.
Do you believe that you could be, if you're chosen
as a juror, fair and impartial to both sides and listen to all
the evidence and the law that I would give you?
MR. HARWOOD:
THE COURT:

I'm sure I could.

Would you be willing to do so?

MR. HARWOOD:
THE COURT:

I would.
Okay.

Thank you.

Mr. Hatch?
MR. HATCH:

I have no other questions.

THE COURT:

Ms. Shapiro?

MS. SHAPIRO:
THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

MR. HARWOOD:
THE COURT:

No, sir.

Thank you.

You're welcome.

(Further proceedings recorded but not transcribed.)
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DENTON M. HATCH, #1413
Attorney for Plaintiff
128 West 900 North, Suite C
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
Phone (801) 794-3852
Fax (801) 794-3859
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KEARL,
AFFIDAVIT OF
DENTON M. HATCH

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 050401593
Judge Gary D. Stott
Division 4

EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY,
Defendant.

Denton M. Hatch, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am Plaintiffs counsel in the captioned case.

2.

After the jury rendered its verdict I contacted juror W. Gary Harwood by

telephone.
3.

I recorded the conversation between him and myself which was very short. I have

a copy of that recording in my possession.
4.

My conversation with Mr. Harwood went as follows:
Hatch: Good morning is this Mr. Harward?
Harward: Yes.
1

Hatch: This is Denton Hatch calling. Do you know who I am?
Harward: Yes, I do.
Hatch: I am calling to see if you might be willing to talk to me about the trial last
week.
Harwood: I don't think so. I think it is over. I don't have anything to explain.
And I think I had help making the decision. Thank you for calling,
DATED this

day ori^TITbfer 2007.

fl

I \I
6LS

Denton Hatch

State of Utah

)
§
County of Utah )

Denton Hatch, upon being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has read the
foregoing document and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true to the best of his
knowledge and belief.
Dated this

(j? day of November 2007.

£ fPVftd

Notary Public/DepiAy Clerk

Hb,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Denton
M. Hatch on this

W day of November 2007 to the following:

Ruth A. Shapiro
Christensen & Jensen, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Secretary
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DENTON M. HATCH, #1413
Attorney for Plaintiff
128 West 900 North, Suite C
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
Phone (801) 794-3852
Fax (801) 794-3859
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KEARL,
AFFIDAVIT OF
TREVOR fcEUENZEL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 050401593
Judge Gary D. Stott
pivision 4

EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY,
Defendant.

Trevorfceuciizcl,being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.

I am the son of Lana Marshall, who is Robert Kearl's fiancee and who is the

plaintiff in this case.
2.

lam 15 years old.

3.

I attended the trial in the captioned case.

4.

During the jury deliberation I was the only person from the audience in the

courtroom. Defense counsel and Defendant were also in the courtroom at their table. Plaintiff
and Plaintiffs counsel and all of the audience were gone.
5.

I talked briefly to Defendant's counsel about sports. Then I laid down on the
1

bench to send a text message to a friend.
6.

At that time Judge Stott walked over to defense counsel's table and complimented

defense counsel on her work in the case and said that he thought she had a strong finish.
7.

The Judge then said, "Good luck."

8.

I don't think that the Judge saw me because at the time he came to defense

counsel I was laying in a bench in the audience section of the courtroom, but I was close enough
that I could hear clearly.
DATED this Z\

day of February 2008.

Trevor fccnenzef
State of Utah

)
§
County of Utah )
Trevor Leuenzel, upon being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has read the
foregoing document and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true to the best of his
knowledge and belief.
Dated this

M

day of February 2008.

Notary Public
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DENTON M. HATCH, #1413
Attorney for Plaintiff
128 West 900 North, Suite C
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
Phone (801) 794-3852
Fax (801) 794-3859
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT KEARL,
WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION
TO ENTER DISQUALIFICATION

Plaintiff,

Case No. 050401593
Judge Gary D. Stott
Division 4

vs.
EDWIN RAY OKELBERRY,
Defendant.

Plaintiff hereby withdraws his motion to enter disqualification because it was not filed
timely. Although the motion is withdrawn, the court's actions as outlined in the affidavit filed
with Plaintiffs motion to enter disqualification shows bias. Plaintiff believes that the court should
enter disqualification on the court's own motion even though Plaintiff has withdrawn his motion.
As stated in Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 E:
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including...the judge has a personal
bias...
Defendant's counsel's affidavit is further evidence of the Judge's bias. She states that
Judge Stott met ex parte with her, gave her a "critique" of her performance at trial and
1

complimented her on her "reasoning" and "presentation." Defense counsel argues that Judge
Stott's statement of "good luck" was a pleasantry and not a show of bias. Plaintiff sees it
differently. Plaintiff sees it as an unmistakable show of bias. In any event, it was all inappropriate
under Canon 3 and presents a situation in which the judge's impartiality is reasonably questioned.1
The court's meeting with defense counsel ex parte also violates Code of Judicial Conduct.
Cannon 3 B.(7):
..Except at authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and
shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or
impending proceeding...
No doubt, the reason for the strictness of this rule and the lack of numerous exceptions, is
the fact that it is a clear show of bias, and encourages conversations like the one involved here.
Once again, Defense counsel admits that the ex parte meeting took place, although she argues that
it was unintentional and harmless. How hard would it have been to include Plaintiff and Plaintiffs
counsel who were in another room? If Plaintiff was included would the judge have given defense
counsel a critique of her performance and complimented her and wished her "good luck"? Would
the judge have done it if he knew that Plaintiffs step son was laying down in the bench out of
x

The ex parte meeting is consistent with the prejudice Plaintiff experienced during the
trial. Embarrassing Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel unnecessarily, making what Plaintiff believed
to be unfounded rulings, and protecting the Defendant whenever possible all add up to prejudice
by the Court that influenced the trial and the jurors. However, these actions are difficult to
describe and evaluate, even though they add up cumulatively to a result which is significant.
When the ex parte meeting took place it was a clear manifestation of the prejudice which
Plaintiff believed he experienced during the trial and gave Plaintiff a concrete example of the
Court's prejudice.
2

sight close by? It is doubtful. The fact that the Judge thought that Plaintiff was not present gave
him liberty to express his true feelings and he took the opportunity.
Perhaps the judge thought that the case was over. However, the fact that the case was still
"pending" is clearly shown by the record. The motions filed and decisions made indicate the case
was not over and is ongoing.
Therefore, even though the Plaintiff withdraws his motion, the Court should enter
disqualification as required by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
DATED this

^7

day of February 2008.

Denton M. Hatch

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed and faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Withdrawal of Motion to Enter Disqualification on this ^f

day of February 2008 to the

following:
Ruth A. Shapiro
Christensen & Jensen, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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